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Abstract
We study the stable marriage problem in two-sided markets with randomly generated pref-
erences. We consider agents on each side divided into a constant number of “soft tiers”, which
intuitively indicate the quality of the agent. Specifically, every agent within a tier has the same
public score, and agents on each side have preferences independently generated proportionally
to the public scores of the other side.
We compute the expected average rank which agents in each tier have for their partners
in the men-optimal stable matching, and prove concentration results for the average rank in
asymptotically large markets. Furthermore, we show that despite having a significant effect on
ranks, public scores do not strongly influence the probability of an agent matching to a given tier
of the other side. This generalizes results of [Pit89] which correspond to uniform preferences.
The results quantitatively demonstrate the effect of competition due to the heterogeneous at-
tractiveness of agents in the market, and we give the first explicit calculations of rank beyond
uniform markets.
1 Introduction
The theory of stable matching, initiated by [GS62], has lead to a deep understanding of two-sided
matching markets and inspired successful real-world market designs. Examples for such markets
include marriage markets, online dating, assigning students to schools, labor markets, and college
admissions. In a market matching “men” to “women” (a commonly used analogy), a matching is
stable if no man-woman pair prefer each other over their assigned partners.
A fundamental issue is characterizing stable outcomes of matching markets, i.e. the outcome
agents should expect to based on market characteristics. Such characterizations are not only useful
for describing outcomes but also likely to be fruitful in market designs. Numerous papers so
far have studied stable matchings in random markets, in which agents’ preferences are generated
uniformly at random [Pit89, KMP90, AKL17, Pit19]. This paper contributes to the literature by
expanding these results to a situation where preferences are drawn according to different tiers of
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“public scores”, generalizing the uniform case. These public scores intuitively correspond to the
attractiveness of the agent, and we ask how an agent’s attractiveness benefits their outcome in the
market.
Formally, we study the following class of tiered random markets. There are n men and n women.
Each side of the market is divided into a constant number of “soft tiers”. There is fraction of i
women in tier i, each of which has a public score αi. And there is a fraction of δj men in tier j,
each of which has a public score βj . For each agent we draw complete preference lists by sampling
without replacement proportionally to the public scores of agents on the other side of the market.1
So a man’s preference list is generated by sampling women one at a time without replacement
according to a distribution that is proportional to their public scores. Using α,  to denote the
vector of scores and proportions of tier on the women’s side, we see that the marginal probability
of drawing a woman in tier i is αi/(n ·α). An analogous statement holds for the tier configuration
β, δ of the men. These preferences are a natural next-step beyond the uniform distribution over
preference lists, and provide a priori heterogeneous quality of agents while still being tractable to
theoretical analysis.
Our primary goal is to study the average rank of agents in each tier under the man-optimal
stable matching, with a focus on the asymptotic behavior in large markets. The rank of an agent
id defined to be the index of their partner on their full preference list, where lower is better.
Additionally, we prove results on the match type distribution, i.e. the fraction of agents of tier i
women matched to tier j men (for each i, j). We show that, for large enough markets, the following
hold to within an arbitrarily small approximation factor:
(i) With high probability, the average rank of men in tier j is
 ·α
αmin
· 1
δ · β−1 ·
lnn
βj
(ii) With high probability, the average rank of women in tier i is
(δ · β)(δ · β−1)αmin
αi
n
lnn
(iii) The probability that a woman in tier i matches to a man in tier j is δj
where β−1j = 1/βj denotes the vector of the reciprocals of men’s public scores, and αmin denotes
the smallest public score on the women’s side.
Intuition and Observations As in the case of uniform preferences [Pit89], in the man optimal
stable outcome, men get a much lower rank than women. Indeed, both men and women get the same
order of rank as in the uniform case (lnn and n/ lnn, respectively). This in itself is an interesting
consequence of this work – a constant tier structure effects the market only up to constants. This
fact also highlights that determining these constants is an interesting area for investigation, as the
constants capture how the outcome of the market changes with respect to the public scores. The
first observation we make is that agents on each side get a rank inversely proportional to their
public score.
Perhaps more interesting is the following observation: The rank of both sides depends on the
tier structure of the other side, but each tier is effected the same amount by the tier parameters
1These are also termed popularity-based preferences [GMM19, IM15] and also equivalent to generating preferences
according to an Multinomial-Logit (MNL) induced by the public scores.
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of the other side. This is closely related to the fact that the probability of a woman matching to a
man in tier j is proportional to only the number of men in tier j (regardless of the tier the woman
lies in). Moreover, both  · α/αmin and (δ · β)(δ · β−1) are always greater than or equal to one2.
Thus, in these markets, any heterogeneity in the public scores of one side harms the average ranks
of the other side (but does not significantly affect the likelihood that an agent matches to a certain
tier on the other side).
Another interesting feature is the following: While the average ranks for men’s tiers depend
on public scores distributions on both sides of the market, the average rank of women in tier i
depends only on the ratio between αi and the public score αmin of the bottom tier of women (and
the distribution of public scores on the men’s side). Intuitively, the rank of the men depends on
the distribution of scores of the women because men are competing to avoid being matched to the
lowest tier of women.
To elaborate on that last point, let us first consider the total number of proposals made under
the man-proposing DA (which turns out to be largely independent of the tier structure on the
men). The algorithm will terminate when the last woman receives a proposal. Naturally one would
expect that this woman will belong to the bottom tier. Therefore, using standard coupon collector
arguments, the total number of proposals made to women in the bottom tier until they all receive
a proposal is expected to be (minn) ln(minn), where min is the fraction of women in the bottom
tier. These proposals are a minαmin/ ·α fraction of the total proposals, so one expects the number
of total proposals to be
(minn) ln(minn)
minαmin/ ·α =
 ·α
αmin
· n lnn−O(n).
This introduces the factor of  ·α/αmin in the men’s ranks (i.e. the number of proposals per man).
On the other hand, the probability that one of these proposals goes to a woman in tier i is
αi/(n · α), implying that such a woman should receive roughly (αi/αmin) lnn proposals. Thus,
for a given woman, the increase in the total number of proposals caused by the tier proportions 
is exactly canceled out by the likelihood that a proposal goes to that woman, and the only thing
which matters is the woman’s score (relative to the bottom tier). If men are uniform, women should
then expect rank roughly (αmin/αi)(n/ lnn), which helps explain the corresponding factor above.
Consider now the public scores of the men, and for simplicity assume that the bottom tier of
men has score 1. Suppose for the sake of demonstration that every time a man with public score
βj proposes to a woman who is already matched, this man is βj times more likely to be accepted
than a man with than a man with public score 1.3 We would expect that such a man makes a 1/βj
fraction fewer proposals before his next acceptance, and indeed 1/βj fewer proposals overall. Let
S be the total number of proposals, let rj denote the rank of a man in tier j, and rmin the rank of
the bottom tier of men. If every tier of size δjn each accounts for a share of proposals proportional
to 1/βj , then we should have
S =
∑
j
(nδj)β
−1
j rmin =⇒ rmin =
S
nδ · β−1 , rj =
S
(nδ · β−1)βj ,
which introduces the factor of 1/((δ · β−1)βj) in the men’s rank.
The final remaining factor is (δ · β)(δ · β−1) in the women’s preferences. Deriving this term
requires reasoning about the number of proposals from each tier of men received by a fixed women
2 To prove (δ · β)(δ · β−1) ≥ 1, use Jensen’s inequality to conclude that ∑j δjβj ≥ 1/(∑j δjβ−1j ).
3 As we discuss below, this approximation is only valid if the woman is already matched with a man she ranks
highly. A major technical step in our proof is showing that, in certain situations, “enough” women are “matched well
enough” for this approximation to be used.
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w. Building from the previous paragraph, we reason that each of the δjn men in tier j make a
number of proposals proportional to 1/βj . Each such proposal has the same probability of going to
w, regardless of the tier j, so the number of proposals w receives from tier j men is proportional to
δj/βj . The factor (δ ·β)(δ ·β−1) then arises for somewhat technical reasons (described in section 5)
which have to do with the way women generate their preference list.
We now describe how result (iii), which may seem somewhat more mysterious than the other
results, emerges as a corollary of computing the ranks women receive. We argued above that w
receives approximately (δj/βj)Ui proposals from men in tier j, for some value of Ui independent of
j. Recall that w applies added weight βj to each proposal she sees from a man in tier j. Moreover,
the identity of w’s favorite proposal is independent of the order in which w saw proposals. Thus,
the probability that w’s favorite proposal (i.e. the proposal of the man she matches to) came from
tier j is approximately (δjUi)/Ui = δj , which is independent of βj , as well as independent of the
tier w is in. Thus, up to lower order terms, the distribution of match types is the same as it would
be under a uniformly random matching.
Intuitively, result (iii) arises men make enough proposals to offset any disadvantage (in the
type of their match) they have due to public score. Due to the highly connected and relatively
competitive nature of our markets, men in the lowest tier make more proposals, but they are not
more likely to end up matched with lower tier agents. Put another way, men in lower tiers are less
likely to attain matches they idiosyncratically like, but often settle for a high-quality agent which
is low on their personal preference list. This indicates that public scores that differ by constant
weight do not provide enough a priori enough predictive power over the matches agents receive and
therefore the match is not assortative. In particular, agents with lower public scores can still hope
to achieve high-tier matches if they consider enough options.
Techniques Our proofs require developing some technical tools that may be of independent
interest, especially when we reason about the ranks achieved by the men. We build on the analysis of
DA from [Pit89] and [AKL17] to handle public scores rather than just uniform random preferences.
As in these previous works, a key step in our proof is letting all men but one (call him m) first
propose and match though DA, and then tracking the proposals of m (this works because DA is
independent of the order of proposals). For demonstration purposes, let’s call the proposals before
man m the “setup”. A key fact in previous works is that the distribution of proposals made by m
is identical for every man, and moreover that the distribution of setups is identical as well. This
fails to hold in tiered random markets, and thus we must develop new techniques.
We prove that, for some setups, the rank a man can achieve is approximately given by a certain
geometric distribution, whose parameter p is essentially the probability that a proposal by that man
will be accepted. We then prove that, up to lower order terms, this success parameter scales up
with the public score of the men. This gives the fact that the rank of men is inversely proportional
to public score.
Characterizing the setups where our proof goes through requires a technical analysis, and we
term the setups which work “smooth matching states”. The most crucial thing we need for these
setups is that many women are matched to partners they rank highly, which helps us prove that 1)
men are likely to remain matched to their first acceptance (so our approximation with a geometric
distribution is valid), and 2) a man with fitness β is approximately β times more likely to be
accepted every time. For details, see section 4.
Finally, to prove that the average rank of men within a tier concentrates, we need to show
the correlation between the ranks of different men is not too large. Thus, we actually track the
proposals of the last two men to propose, and find that the joint distribution of the ranks of these
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men can be approximated by a pair of independent geometric distributions. Intuitively, this is
because men do not propose to very many women overall, and thus the last two men are unlikely
to interfere with each other as they make proposals.
The crucial aspects of our model are that preferences of each agent are independent and identi-
cally distributed, preference weights are constant, and the market is roughly in balance. While our
techniques are useful to reason about markets which do not have these properties, the results are
not nearly as clean; indeed the tier structure simplifies our analysis, but most of it goes through if
each agent has an individual, constant, bounded public score.
1.1 Related literature
Several papers have studied matching markets with complete preference lists that are generated
uniformly at random. [Pit89] and [KMP90] analyze properties of stable matchings in a balanced
market with n men and n women. [Pit89] finds that in the man-optimal stable matching, men
and women match on average to their lnn and nlnn ranks, respectively. Our results generalize
these findings to markets with preferences induced by public scores, thus incorporating much more
heterogeneity in the market. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to explicitly
complete expected ranks beyond a uniform setting.
[AKL17, Pit19, CT19] also study the average ranks in random markets with complete and
uniformly drawn preferences but with an imbalance between men and women. These papers find
that in any stable matching the average ranks of men and women are similar to the average
ranks under the short-side-proposing DA. Additionally, the paper [KMQ20] investigates the relation
between the imbalance and the length of preference lists (though the model is still uniform for each
agent). This paper does not consider imbalanced markets but we believe that similar techniques to
those we develop will be useful to reason about unbalanced tiered random markets.
Several papers looked at random matching markets in which preferences are generated based
on public scores [IM15, KP09, ABH14]. These papers restrict attention to the size of the core (a
measure of the difference between the man-optimal and woman-optimal outcome) and strategic
manipulation of agents under a stable matching mechanism. Key assumptions in these papers
generate outcomes which leave many agents unmatched. In particular, their models either assume
that preference lists of men are of constant length, or, alternatively, one side has many more agents
than the other.4
Other papers have addressed tiered matching markets, especially in market design settings.
However, these papers mostly study “hard tiers”, i.e. such that agents in higher tiers are deter-
ministically ranked above lower tiers by every agent on the other side. Examples include [BST17,
ABKS17]. [Lee16] also considers a certain restricted tiered model of cardinal utilities (which is
incomparable with our model), focusing on which tier of agents match to which tier.
A very recent paper addressing a similar preference distribution as our work is [GMM19].
While our work focuses on the rank agents achieve in the man-optimal outcome (a canonical stable
matching), [GMM19] focuses on the size of the core (especially in markets with more preference
correlation than we consider here).
Our contribution to the literature is a detailed study of “soft tiers”, a natural special case of
the popularity preferences of [IM15, KP09, GMM19]. In cases where each agent’s utility for each
match on the other side is independent and identically distributed, popularity preferences are the
natural next step beyond uniform markets, as they model situations where agents on each side have
4Some papers additionally consider manipulations in more restricted randomized settings [CS14] or in deterministic
(worst case) settings [Gon14].
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significant but non-definitive variation in a priori quality. Our results give insight to how constant-
factor preference biases affect stable matching markets, including the first explicit calculations of
expected rank beyond uniform markets.
2 Definitions and Preliminaries
A matching market consists of a finite set of men M and a finite set of women W . Each man
(woman) has a complete and strict preference list over women (men). A matching is a mapping
µ : M ∪W → M ∪W such that: for every m ∈ M , µ(m) ∈ W (or µ(m) is undefined), for every
woman w ∈ W , µ(w) ∈ M (or µ(w) is undefined), and for every m ∈ M and w ∈ W , µ(m) = w
if and only if µ(m) = w. A matching µ is stable if no man/woman pair who are not matched in µ
prefer each other to their matched partners.
It is well-known that there is a unique man-optimal stable matching, which can be found using
the man-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA). While this algorithm does not fully specify
an execution order, it’s a classically known result that the order does not effect the final outcome.
Algorithm 1: (Man-Proposing) Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (DA)
1 Initialize matching µ to be empty (i.e. every agents partner is undefined);
2 Initialize U = M to be the set of all unmatched men;
3 while |U| > 0 do
4 Choose any m ∈ U ;
5 Let m propose to his most preferred woman w to whom he has not made a proposal yet;
6 if w prefers m to µ(w) (or if µ(w) is undefined) then
7 if µ(w) is defined then Add µ(w) to U ;
8 Remove m from U ;
9 Assign µ(w) = m;
10 end
11 end
Lemma 2.1 ([GS62, MW70]). The same proposals are made in every run of DA, regardless of
which man is chosen to propose at each step.
We study the man-optimal stable matching in a class of tiered random markets, which will
be defined below. We will assume that |M | = |W | and that no agent finds any other agent on
the other side unacceptable. We will also assume that each side draws their preferences from an
identical and independent underlying distribution, and moreover these preferences are generated
by repeatedly sampling without replacement from a fixed distribution on the agents of each side.
In [IM15, GMM19], this assumption is termed “popularity-based preferences”, with the weight of
an agent in the distribution intuitively indicating their popularity for agents on the other side.
Our main goal is to study randomized matching markets with a constant number of constant
weight tiers of agents on each side. For this entire paper, we consider the tier structure to be
defined by fixed proportions , δ of agents in each tier and constant weights α,β for each tier, and
we investigate the outcome of the man-proposing DA as n→∞.
Definition 2.2. Consider constant vectors α,  ∈ Rk1>0 and β, δ ∈ Rk2>0, where ‖‖1, ‖δ‖1 = 1. A
tiered matching market of size n with respect to α, ,β, δ is defined by generating agent’s preference
lists as follows:
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• The set of n women W is divided into tiers T1, . . . , Tk1, of size |Ti| = in each5. Define a
distribution W on women such that a woman in tier i is selected with probability proportional
to αi. That is, the weight of w ∈ Ti in W is αi/(n ·α) (which we often denote by pii).
• The set of n men M is divided into tiers T1, . . . , Tk2, of size |Tj | = δjn each. Define a
distribution M on men such that a man in tier j is selected with probability proportional to
βj. That is, the weight of m ∈ Tj in M is βj/(nδ · β).
For each man m independently, women are repeatedly sampled fromW without replacement, and the
order in which women are selected is m’s preference list. Preferences for the women are analogously
drawn over the distribution M. The rank that a man has for a woman w is the index of w on his
preference list (where lower is better).
We refer to each αi as the weight or public score of the women in tier i, and similarly for the
men. For simplicity of certain arguments, we assume that each αi ≥ 1 and each βj ≥ 1 (although
for clarity of our results, we do not assume that the smallest weight is exactly 1). We write αmin
for the weight of the bottom tier of women, and min for the corresponding tier proportion.
Using a simple generalization of the “principle of deferred decisions” used in [Knu76], we can
arrive at a characterization of the random process of running DA with a tiered matching market.
Lemma 2.3. The distribution of runs of DA for a tiered matching market can be generated as
follows: For the men, every time a man is chosen to propose, he samples a woman at random from
W, and repeats this until he samples a woman who he has not yet proposed to.
For the women, suppose w has seen proposals from a set of men p(w), and let Γw =
∑
m∈p(w) β(m),
where β(m) denotes the public score of a man m ∈ p(m). Then if a proposal from a man m∗ with
public score β∗ arrives, w accepts the proposal from m∗ with probability
β∗
β∗ + Γw
.
Proof. The above formula gives the probability that m∗ is chosen as w’s favorite out of the set of
men p(w) ∪ {m∗}. The only additional observation we need to make is that the probability that
m∗ is the new favorite is independent of the identity of the old favorite.
We often call Γw the total “weight of proposals” woman w has seen at some point during DA.
2.1 Deferred acceptance with re-proposals
With respect to any popularity-based model of preferences, we can define a procedure analogous to
DA. In our case, we will show that the difference between DA and this procedure is indeed small.
Definition 2.4. Consider any random matching market with men’s preferences determined by
sampling from a distribution W over women. The deferred acceptance with re-proposals algorithm
is defined as being identical to Algorithm 1, except
• Every time a man is chosen to propose to a woman, he draws a woman from W with replace-
ment, and may propose more than once to a single woman.
• Women’s preferences are consistent throughout proposals from the same man (so if a woman
rejected a man before, she will reject him again).
Because re-proposals are ignored, this process will always yield the same outcome as algorithm 1.
5 Note that, for most vectors , δ, many values of n will produce tier sizes which are not integers. However, as all
our results are continuous in , δ this is not a problem – for any particular fixed n, each tier size can be rounded in
a way that effectively just changes , δ by a tiny amount, and our results will still hold as written as n→∞.
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Notation: We write x = (1± )y to mean (1− )y ≤ x ≤ (1 + )y. We let  denote an arbitrarily
small constant greater than 0, while  and i denote the tier parameters of the women. We let
αmin denote the smallest public score for the women’s side, and min denotes the corresponding tier
proportion. We let v ·w denote the inner product of vectors v,w. We denote the exponential and
geometric distributions by Exp(λ) and Geo(p), respectively. We denote the fact that a random
variable X is a draw from a distribution D by X ∼ D. We use X  Y to denote the fact that X is
statistically dominated by Y (i.e. for all t ∈ R, we have P [X ≥ t] ≤ P [Y ≥ t]). We let Cov(X,Y )
denote the covariance of X and Y . We write f(n) = O˜(g(n)) if there exists a constant k such that
f(n) = O(g(n) logk(g(n))).
3 The Coupon Collector and the Total Number of Proposals
Fix a tier structure α,  corresponding to men’s preferences over the women. Consider running
deferred acceptance with re-proposals. Recall that each man samples a woman in tier i with
probability pii = αi/(n ·α) each draw. Define pimin = αmin/(n ·α) as the probability of drawing
a woman in the lowest tier (and keep in mind that pimin scales like O(1/n)).
The core tool we use to reason about the total number of proposals in DA is the classically
studied coupon collector process. In particular, we study this process when probabilities of drawing
the different coupons falls into different tiers of a constant-factor difference in probability.
Definition 3.1. Given a probability distribution (pi)i∈[n], we define the coupon collector with
unequal probabilities as follows: once every time step, an integer from [n] is drawn independently
and with replacement according to distribution (pi)i∈[n]. The coupon collector random variable with
respect to (pi)i∈[n] is defined as the number of total draws required before every integer in [n] has
appeared at least once.
The coupon collector T which we are interested in is defined by taking the distribution W of
men’s preferences.
We’ll show in section 3.1 that, in our case, this random process is also very close to that of DA
(without re-proposals). For now, we simply bound the expectation of the coupon collector (with the
proof deferred to appendix A). Note that similar probabilistic problems have been considered before
(see e.g. [Bra63, DP12]) but we include our own full proofs in appendix A and B for completeness.
Theorem 3.2. Let T denote the number of draws in a coupon collector process with weights pro-
portional to W. We have
E [T ] =
(
1±O(1/ lnn)) ·α
αmin
n lnn.
Remark 3.3. While we are mostly interested in the asymptotic performance of these matching
markets, we make one comment here that the above big-O notation hides a constant factor of order
ln(1/min). For small values of min, this can be much larger than lnn for most realistic market sizes.
Note that this error term already showed up in the intuition given in section 1, where our estimate
for the total number of proposals had an additive term of O(ln(min)n). For more information, see
proposition A.4.
3.1 The Total Number of Proposals in Deferred Acceptance
Let S = Sn denote the total number of proposals made a run of DA with random preferences given
by our tiered market. As before, let T = Tn denote the distribution of a coupon collector with
8
distribution W. As in many prior studies of randomized deferred acceptance, our starting point is
the fact that S is statistically dominated by T :
The connection to stable matchings is the following very simple observation, which has been
used in many previous works [KMP90, Pit89]:
Proposition 3.4. The coupon collector random variable T is distributed identically to the total
number of proposals made in deferred acceptance with re-proposals (regardless of the preferences
that women have for men).
Moreover, if S is the number of proposals in DA, then S  T (i.e. S is statistically dominated
by T ).
Proof. First, recall that DA terminates as soon as every man is matched. Observe that women never
return to being unmatched once they recieve a single proposal. Because the market is balanced
(i.e. |W | = |M |), this means DA will terminate as soon as every woman has been proposed to.
Moreover, because re-proposals are allowed, every proposal is distributed exactly according to W.
Thus, ignoring the identity of the man doing the proposing, T is distributed exactly according to
the coupon collector random process.
Furthermore, we can recover the exact distribution S of proposal in DA simply by ignoring each
repeated proposal in T . Thus, S ≤ T for each run of deferred acceptance with re-proposals, so
S  T .
We now proceed to show that the upper bound provided by T is essentially tight, i.e. there is
not a big difference between T and S. The key step will be to upper bound maximum number of
distinct women any man proposes to in S, and thus upper bound the probability that any proposal
in T is a repeat for the man making the proposal. Crucially, this lemma will have to account for the
preferences of the women (which up until this point have been ignored, but which play a significant
roll in the distribution of proposals in DA). Recall that we denote the sizes of the tiers of the men
by the vector δ, and the public scores of the men in each tier by β.
Lemma 3.5. Consider running DA with all men except m∗, and suppose that at most O(n lnn)
proposals are made during this process. Afterwards, consider m∗ joining and run DA until the end.
Then for any C ≥ 0, with probability 1 − 1/nC , the number of proposals made by m∗ is at most
O(C ln2 n).
Proof. This proof follows a similar logic as the proof of Lemma B.4 (ii) in [AKL17]. Suppose m∗
has public score β∗, and that he proposes at the end (and O(n lnn) prior proposals have been
made). We proceed as follows:
1. When m∗ makes a proposal, he will choose a woman who he has not yet proposed to. For some
fixed proposal index i of m∗, let’s denote the set of all women m∗ has not proposed to by W∗,
and denote by W∗ the distribution of m∗’s next proposal, i.e. a sample over W∗ weighted by
the public scores αi. For a women w denote her sample weight by α(w) and the set of proposals
she has received by p(w). Further denote by Γw =
∑
m∈p(w) β(m) the sum of the public scores
of men who have proposed to w.
Suppose that |W∗| ≥ n/2, i.e. that m∗ has not yet proposed to over half the women. Using the
assumption that the total number of proposals made is at most O(n lnn), we can bound the
expected total weight of proposals women have seen by
E
w∼W∗
[Γw] =
∑
w∈W∗ α(w)Γw∑
w∈W∗ α(w)
≤ αmax
∑
w∈W Γw
|W∗|αmin ≤
αmaxβmax ·O(n lnn)
|W∗|αmin ≤ O(lnn).
9
Thus, by lemma 2.3, the probability that the proposal by m∗ will be accepted is
p1 := E
w∼W∗
[
β∗
β∗ + Γw
]
≥ β∗
β∗ + Ew∼W∗ [Γw]
≥ Ω(1/ lnn).
where the first inequality is due to Jensen’s inequality.
2. If m∗ proposes to w and is accepted, then the subsequent rejection chain can either end at
the last woman without proposals, wlast, or cycles back to w who this time rejects m∗. Notice
that for each subsequent proposal, the ratio between the probability that it goes to wlast (in
which case the process will be terminated) and the probability that it returns to w is at most
αmax : αmin (and possibly less if the proposing man has already proposed to w). Hence, the
probability that the chain ends at the last women wlast is bounded below by
p2 :=
αmin
αmax + αmin
≥ Ω(1).
Note that this is ignoring the chance that a new proposal by w is rejected, but it still suffices
for a lower bound.
3. The probability that m∗ makes more than K ln2 n proposals is thus bounded above by
(1− p1p2)K ln2 n ≤ exp(−p1p2K ln2 n) = exp(−Ω(K lnn)) ≤ n−C
as long as we choose K = Ω(C) large enough.
Corollary 3.6. For any constant C ≥ 1, with probability 1 − 1/nC , the maximum number of
proposals made by any man in DA is O(C ln2 n).
Proof. By 3.4 and B.1, the total number of proposals made in DA is O(Cn lnn) with probability
1 − 1/nC . In particular, if we consider any m∗ and let all other agent propose, this will be true.
Recall that by lemma 2.1, DA is independent of the order in which men are chosen to propose.
Thus, for each man m∗ we can apply lemma 3.5 to get that, with probability 1−1/nC+1, m∗ makes
fewer than O((C+ 1) ln2 n) = O(C ln2 n) proposals. Taking a union bound over the n men gets the
desired result.
Remark 3.7. Both of the above results hold for deferred acceptance with re-proposals as well as
deferred acceptance. Indeed, even with re-proposals, deferred acceptance will be independent of the
order of proposals (as re-proposals are ignored by the women). Moreover, the logic required to prove
points 1. and 2. of the proof of lemma 3.5 is only easier to prove when men sample over all of W
as opposed to just the set W∗.
The above result is enough to show that proposition 3.2 holds for DA as well for the coupon
collector, because repeated proposals are at most a O(ln2 n/n) = o(1) fraction of total proposals in
deferred acceptance with re-proposals. We defer the proof to appendix C.
Theorem 3.8. Let S be the total number of proposals made in DA with tiers of women ,α, and
arbitrary constant tiers on the men. We have
E [S] =
(
1−O(ln2 n/n))E [T ] = (1±O(1/ lnn)) ·α
αmin
n lnn.
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4 Rank Achieved by the Men
Up until this point, our arguments have only crudely considered the preferences women have for
men. Due to the asymmetry across the different tiers, this means we cannot yet calculate the
expected rank men get.
Consider a manm in tier j. Our main goal is to prove that the rank ofm is inversely proportional
to βj . As in 3.5, the core tool of our proof will be the fact that deferred acceptance is independent
of execution order (by 2.1), and thus we can wait until all other men have finished proposing and
found a match before letting m propose. Once this is done, the major ideas are
1. Suppose m has public score 1, and define
p = E
w∼W
[P [w accepts a proposal from m]] .
Note that, if m were able to propose to a woman independently multiple times, the number of
proposals until m gets his first acceptance would be exactly distributed according to Geo(p),
and the expected value would be 1/p. We show that (because men make much less than n
proposals) the difference due to re-proposals is not large.
2. Becausem is the last man to propose, most women have already seen many proposals and arrived
at a decent match. When m gets his first acceptance, he should thus be likely to stay where he
is. We show that, while the probability of m proposing to more women is non-negligible, it still
contributes only O(1) in expectation. So m’s expected rank is 1/p up to lower-order terms.
3. Another consequence of a women w receiving a large number of proposals is the following:
P
[
w accepts a proposal from m′ with weight β
]
≈ β · P [w accepts a proposal from m with weight 1] .
simply by 2.3 and the fact that β/(β + Γw) ≈ β · 1/(1 + Γw) for Γw (the sum of public scores of
men who proposed to w) large. Thus, if m had public score β, the effective value of p would be
approximately βp, and the expected rank of m would become approximately 1/(βp). In other
words, while we are not able to calculate p directly, we show that p scales properly with m’s
score.
4. Finally, we prove that the above holds for most sequences of proposals of men before m, and thus
it holds in expectation over the entire execution of DA. Note that the distribution of proposals
before m changes slightly depending on which tier m is chosen from, but in a large market, we
do not expect this to make a big difference.
The biggest difference between the above proof sketch and its implementation is that we focus
on two men proposing at the end of DA. This serves to address point 4 above – we are able to show
that, for the vast majority of sequences of proposals before the last two men, their expected ranks
are proportional to the ratio of their scores. Thus, this ratio holds in expectation over all of DA.
Focusing on two men also allows us to bound the correlation between the two men’s ranks, which
is crucial for our concentration results.
In our proof, we also formalize what it means for all men other than two to propose, with the
notion of a “partial matching state”. Moreover, we give the term smooth to those states in which
the proof sketch above goes through. Most crucially, in smooth matching states, “most women
have received a lot of proposals”, so that the reasoning in points 2 and 3 are valid. Additionally, to
address certain technicalities (such as being able to bound the magnitude of the expected number
of proposals) we define smooth matching states to not have too many proposals in total.
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4.1 Smooth matching states
Definition 4.1. Given a set of men L, we define the partial matching state excluding L, denoted
µ−L, as follows: Run DA with men in M \ L proposing to W , and keep track of which proposals
were made. More specifically, if µ is the (partial) matching resulting from running DA with a set
of men M \ L and set of women W , and P = {(mi` , wj`)}` is the set of all tuples (mi, wj) where
mi proposed to wj during this process, then µ−L = (µ, P ).
In a random matching market, we consider this state as a random variable. In a tiered random
matching market, to specify this random variable, it suffices to give a multiset of tiers which the
men in L belong to. For a fixed µ−L, denote by Γw the total sum of weights which woman w received
in P .
Note that the state µ−L keeps track of which proposals have been made (in addition to which
current matches are formed) before the men in L propose.
Definition 4.2. We call a partial matching state µ−L smooth if the following hold for some con-
stants C1, C2, C3 > 0:
1. At most C1n lnn proposals were made to women overall.
2. At most n1−C2 women have received fewer than C3 lnn proposals.
The constants C1, C2, C3 in the above depend on the tier structure, and can simply be chosen
such that the following proposition holds. Our arguments will go through if smoothness holds with
respect to any C1, C2, C3 which are held constant as n→∞. The proof is given in appendix D.
Proposition 4.3. Let L = {m1,m2} be any pair of men. After running deferred acceptance, µ−L
is smooth with probability 1− n−Ω(1).
Once we know that µ−L is smooth, our two main tasks are to show that men’s ranks scale inverse-
proportionally to their score, and that the ranks of different men do not correlate too highly. These
are the main technical novelties of the paper. The exact details are given in Appendix E.
Proposition 4.4. Suppose µ−L is smooth, and let r1 and r2 be the ranks of m1 and m2 after
running DA with m1 and m2 starting from µ−L. We have
EL[r1] =
(
1±O(1/ lnn))β2
β1
ELr2.
where we use EL [] to denote taking an expectation over the random process of m1,m2 proposing in
DA after starting from state µ−L.
Proposition 4.5. Suppose µ−L is smooth, and let r1 and r2 be the ranks of m1 and m2 after
running DA with m1 and m2 starting from µ−L. Then we have Cov(ri, rj) = O(ln3/2 n).
4.2 Expected rank of the men
In this subsection, we show that overall, expected rank scale proportionally to fitness (in addition
to under smooth matching states). This allows us to compute the expected rank of the men.
The proofs (deferred to appendix F) follow by carefully keeping track of the (limited) effect of
non-smooth matching states on the expectation.
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Proposition 4.6. Let ri and rj denote the rank of a man in tiers i and j. Then we have
E [ri] =
(
1±O(1/ lnn))βj
βi
E [rj ] .
Theorem 4.7. Let β−1 denote the vector (1/βi)i. For each tier j, the rank rj of men in tier j has
expectation
E [rj ] =
(
1±O(1/ lnn)) E [S]
(nδ · β)βj =
(
1±O(1/ lnn)) ·α
αmin
· 1
(δ · β−1) ·
lnn
βj
.
Finally, we also use our results on the covariance of men’s ranks to prove concentration. We
defer the proof to appendix F. At a high level, the proof follows simply because the weak correlation
implied by 4.5 means that the variance of the average of the ranks is lower-order (compared to its
expectation), so Chebyshev’s inequality can be used.
Theorem 4.8. For any tier j, let R
M
j = (δjn)
−1∑
m rm denote the average rank of men in tier j.
Then, for any  > 0,
R
M
j = (1± )
 ·α
αmin
· 1
(δ · β−1) ·
lnn
βj
with probability approaching 1 as n→∞.
5 Expected rank of the women and the distribution of match types
5.1 Expected rank of women
We saw in sections 4.2 that men achieve ranks proportional to the inverse of their public scores. In
this section, we turn to the women.
To study the rank the women achieve, we need to reason about the number of proposals women
achieve on average. By theorem 4.8, we expect that for each tier j of men, the δjn men make a
total number of proposals approximately
δjβ
−1
j
δ · β−1 ·
α · 
αmin
n lnn.
Each of these proposals goes to a woman in tier i with probability pii = αi/(n · α), so we expect
such a woman to receive approximately (δjβ
−1
j )/(δ · β−1) · (αi/αmin) lnn proposals from men in
tier j. Each of these men has public score βj , so we expect Γw, the total sum of public scores of
men proposing to w, to be roughly
Γw ≈
∑
j
βj
δjβ
−1
j
δ · β−1 ·
αi
αmin
lnn =
αi lnn
αmin(δ · β−1) .
Now, it is not immediately clear how the above value of Γw should translate to the rank that
w gets. Unlike in the case where men are uniform, we cannot simply divide n by the number of
proposals which w receives.
Indeed, suppose a woman w receives exactly the total sum of weight Γw predicted above. What
should her rank be? This is essentially the following: across all tiers of δjn men each, how many do
we expect to beat her best proposal so far? The probability that w ranks a man m higher than her
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match, when viewed according to 2.3, is a function only of the weight β(m) of m and the weight
of proposals Γw which w received. Specifically, this probability is β(m)/(β(m) + Γw) ≈ βj/Γw.
Summing this6 across all the men, we get
E [rw] ≈
∑
m
β(m)
β(m) + Γw
≈ nδ · β
Γw
≈ (δ · β)(δ · β−1)αmin
αi
· n
lnn
It turns out that, with a detailed probabilistic analysis, the above proof sketch goes through.
The details are given in appendix G.
Theorem 5.1. Let R
W
i = (in)
−1∑
w∈Ti rw denote the average rank of women in tier i. For all
 > 0, we have
R
W
i = (1± )(δ · β)(δ · β−1)
αmin
αi
n
lnn
with probability approaching 1 as n→∞.
5.2 The distribution of match types
Fix a woman w is in tier i. We now study the probability that w is matched to a man from some
tier j. In the previous section, we argued that with high probability w receives a total of
δjβ
−1
j
δ · β−1 ·
α · 
αmin
n lnn
proposals from men in tier j. Thus, the contribution to Γw (the total weight of proposals w received)
from men in tier j is
Γj→w ≈ δj
δ · β−1 ·
α · 
αmin
n lnn ≈ δjΓw.
Moreover, it turns out that, with high probability, the above holds up to (1 ± ) for all tiers j
simultaneously. Regardless of the order in which w saw proposals, the probability that w’s favorite
proposal came from a man in tier j is Γj→w/Γw. Thus, this probability is approximately δj . We
formally implement this proof in appendix H.
Theorem 5.2. Consider an arbitrary tier i of women and j of men. For all  > 0, there is an n
large enough such that the probability that a woman in tier i matches to a man in tier j is (1± )δj.
6 Computational Experiments on Expected Rank
In this section, we provide computational experiments to back up the main features of our theorems
– the estimates for the rank which agents on each side achieve. First, we find that, as the theory
suggests, men have a large advantage in rank compared to the women, with men getting rank of
order lnn and women getting of order n/ lnn. More interestingly, these two sets of simulations
together isolate and investigate all of the major constant factors present in our estimates. We find
that, overall, our estimates correspond to the empirical averages.
6 This ignores one thing: a woman will never rank m higher than her match if that m already proposed to her
during DA. But since w only likely receives lnn n/ lnn proposals, the difference is not noticeable.
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6.1 Women divided into tiers
Figures 1, 2, and 3 showcase the expected rank in a market where women are broken into two tiers,
while men have uniform public score. In such a market, theorems 4.8 and 5.2 predict that the
expected rank of men, and the expected rank of women in tier i, are respectively:
 ·α
αmin
· lnn αmin
αi
· n
lnn
In our experiment, there are n = 1000 agents on each side. The tiers of women have fraction
 = (1, 1 − 1), and weight α = (α1, 1), where tier 1 is the “top tier” (i.e. α1 > 1 and αmin = 1).
Each plot has α1 ranging from 1 to 10 at each multiple of 0.25, and 1 ranging from 0.025 to 0.975
at each multiple of 0.025. In each plot, we show the average rank in the result of DA, i.e. the
man-optimal stable matching, as this is the quantity studied in our theorems.
Figure 1 shows men’s average rank of partners, which in this market is approximately the total
number of proposals divided by n, because men are uniform. Note that our prediction becomes
increasingly bad as 1 approaches 1, even though for any fixed constant 1, we have convergence
by 4.8. This is natural because, as per remarks 3.3 and A.5, our estimates break down for fixed
n as min → 0. Indeed, we find that the total number of proposals is much less than our estimate
in cases where min is small, as proposition A.4 simply proves that the true average is at least our
estimate minus O(ln(1/min)n). This comment also applies to plots 2 and 3. Accounting for cases
with very small tiers (say, tiers which grow sublinearly with n) is an intriguing future research
direction.
6.2 Men divided into tiers
Figures 4, 5, and 6 showcase the expected rank in a market where men are broken into two tiers,
while women have uniform public score. In such a market, our prediction for the expected rank of
men in tier j and the expected rank of women are respectively:
1
(δ · β−1) ·
lnn
βj
(δ · β)(δ · β−1) · n
lnn
We again take n = 1000 agents on each side. The tiers of men have fraction δ = (δ1, 1 − δ1)
and weight β = (β1, 1), with β1 > 1. Each plot takes β1 ranging from 1 to 10 at each multiple of
0.25, and δ1 ranging from 0.025 to 0.975 at each multiple of 0.025. Because the women’s side is
balanced, the number of proposals in these markets does not suffer from a great loss of accuracy in
certain parameter settings (as in the previous regime when min was small). However, lower order
terms still make a visible difference, especially in the rank achieved by the women.
7 Summary
Our model and results contribute to the literature towards understanding random stable match-
ing markets. We study the effect of competition that arises from heterogeneous quality in agents,
specifically, when the agents fall into different constant-factor tiers of quality. Our methods provide
new tools for reasoning about the proposal dynamics of deferred acceptance. Many interesting ex-
tensions of our results are left open, including: the effect of non-constant (size, or public score) tiers,
personalized private scores which give agents different distributions of preferences, and imbalance
in the number of agents on each side of the market. In more general settings, should one expect
the matching to be sorted, i.e. that higher tiers will be more likely to match with higher tiers (for
example, [HHA10] demonstrates the presence of sorting in dating markets).
15
Figures 1, 2, and 3 display expected rank in a market with women broken into two tiers
Figure 1: Men’s average rank under DA. The left panel computes the prediction ( ·α/αmin) lnn =
( ·α) lnn, while the right panel is an average over 200 realizations.
Figure 2: Top tier women’s average rank under DA. The left panel computes the prediction
(αmin/αi)(n/ lnn) = (1/α1)(n/ lnn), while the right panel is an average over 200 realizations.
Figure 3: Bottom tier women’s average rank under DA. Our prediction is the constant n/ lnn as
α,  change, whereas the right panel is an average over 200 realizations.
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Figures 4, 5, and 6 display expected rank in a market with men broken into two tiers
Figure 4: Top tier men’s average ranks in DA. The left panel computes the prediction lnn/(β1δ ·
β−1), while the right panel is an average over 200 realizations.
Figure 5: Bottom tier men’s average ranks in DA. The left panel computes the predicted value
lnn/(βminδ · β−1) = lnn/(δ · β−1), while the right panel is an average over 200 realizations.
Figure 6: Women’s average ranks in DA. The left panel computes the prediction (δ · β)(δ ·
β−1)(n/ lnn), while the right panel is an average over 200 realizations.
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A Expectation of the coupon collector
Recall that T denotes the number of draws to a coupon collector with distribution W, as per
definition 3.1. We now give a simple representation of T , generalizing the common representation
used for the case where W is the uniform distribution, and use it to prove a simple upper bound
on the expectation of T .
Proposition A.1. We can write T =
∑n
i=1 τ
(i), where each τ (i) is distributed according to a
geometric distribution Geo(pi) for some value of pi depending on the randomly determined order
in which distinct coupons are collected. The value of pi can be bounded by
(n− i+ 1)pimin ≤ pi ≤ (n− i+ 1)pimax.
Moreover, conditioned on the order in which the distinct coupons are collected, each draw to τ (i) is
independent.
Proof. Let τ (i) denote the number of draws between the appearance of the (i−1)th and ith distinct
coupon. Because each draw is independent, the probability that each draw goes to a new coupon
is exactly the sum of the weights of the n− i+ 1 unseen coupons, divided by n ·α. Thus, each τ (i)
is a geometrically distributed, and furthermore τ (i) are independent if we condition on the realized
values of pi. Moreover, assuming that every uncollected coupon is in the bottom tier, we can bound
pi by
pi ≥ (n− i+ 1)αmin
n ·α = (n− i+ 1)pimin,
and on the other hand, assuming every uncollected coupon is in the top tier,
pi ≤ (n− i+ 1)αmax
n ·α = (n− i+ 1)pimax.
Proposition A.2. We have
E [T ] ≤ pi−1minHn =
(
1 + O˜(1/n)
) ·α
αmin
n lnn
where Hn = lnn+O(1) is the nth harmonic number.
Proof. Write T =
∑n
i=1 τ
(i), where τ (i) ∼ Geo(pi) is as above, so that pi ≥ (n − i + 1)pimin.
Recall that, for any p ≥ q, the distribution Geo(p) is statistically dominated by Geo(q). Letting
Tub =
∑n
i=1 τ
(i)
ub , where τ
(i)
ub are independent draws from Geo((n− i+1)pimin). For any fixed order C
of collection of distinct coupons, τ (i) are independent, and thus (T |C)  Tub. So we have T  Tub
overall. Thus,
E [T ] ≤ E [Tub] =
n∑
i=1
1
(n− i+ 1)pimin = pi
−1
minHn.
We go on to show that this simple upper bound is tight up to lower order terms. The key intu-
ition is that, for most runs of the coupon collector, we spend most of the time waiting for coupons
in the bottom tier to be collected. This intuition is made formal using a standard probability theory
technique, sometimes called “Poissonization”. We include the proof, as in [Ros06], in appendix I
for completeness.
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Lemma A.3. Let TD be a coupon collector random variable with probabilities D = (pi)i∈[n]. For
i = 1, . . . , n, let Xi be an independent draw from Exp(pi), and let X = maxi∈[n]Xi. Then we have
E [TD] = E [X].
Proposition A.4. For T = TW , we have
E [T ] ≥
(
1− ln(1/min)
lnn
)
 ·α
αmin
n lnn = pi−1minHn −O(n).
Proof. Let X be the maximum of n draws from Exp(pii), with one exponential corresponding to
each woman in W, so that E [T ] = E [X]. Let min be the fraction of the n women which are in the
bottom tier, and let X1 be the maximum of minn independent draws from Exp(pimin). It’s clear
that X  X1, and thus E [X] ≥ E [X1].
Using another standard fact from probability theory, namely proposition I.1, we can calculate
the expectation of X1:
E [X1] =
Hminn
pimin
≥ ln(minn)
pimin
=
ln(n)
pimin
+
ln(min)
pimin
≥ ln(n)
pimin
−O(n)
Remark A.5. For all fixed tier structures, the above estimate is equal to the upper bound of
pi−1minHn up to lower order terms. However, if the lowest tier is very small (min close to zero) then
the estimate is quite crude for reasonable values of n.
Our main result on the expectation of the coupon collector is an immediate consequence of A.2
and A.4.
Theorem 3.2. Let T denote the number of draws in a coupon collector process with weights pro-
portional to W. We have
E [T ] =
(
1±O(1/ lnn)) ·α
αmin
n lnn.
B Concentration of the coupon collector
For many of our results, we’ll need fairly tight bounds on the tails of the coupon collector random
variable T . We proceed to give these bounds here, using the standard techniques of “general
Chernoff bounds”.
For the upper tail of T , we are able to achieve polynomial concentration immediately above our
estimate for the expectation of T .
Proposition B.1. For all C > 0, we have
P
[
T ≥ (1 + C) ·α
αmin
n lnn
]
≤ O(n−C/2)
Proof. Let Tub =
∑n
j=1 Tj , where Tj are independent draws from Geo(jpimin) (for pimin ≤ 1/n).
By A.1, we know T is statistically dominated by Tub (where we change the index of summation for
convenience). Thus, it suffices to prove that P
[
Tub ≥ (1 + C)Hnpi−1min
] ≤ 2n−C/2.
We start by separately handling the largest component of Tub, namely T1:
P
[
T1 ≥ (C/2)pi−1minHn
]
= (1− pimin)(C/2)pi
−1
minHn ≤ exp(−(C/2)Hn) ≤ n−C/2
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Now let T−1 =
∑n
j=2 Tj . For some a > 0 which we’ll specify soon,
P
[
T−1 ≥ (1 + C/2)Hnpi−1min
]
= P
[
exp(aT−1) ≥ exp(a(1 + C/2)pi−1minHn)
]
≤ E [exp(aT−1)]
exp(a(1 + C/2)pi−1minHn)
(*)
Due to the independence of the Tjs, the numerator above equals
∏n
i=2E [exp(aTj)].
∀j > 2 : E [exp(aTj)] =
∞∑
i=1
(1− jpimin)j−1(jpimin)eai
=
jpimine
a
1− (1− jpimin)ea =
jpimin
jpimin − (1− e−a)
Note that the above expectation only exists for j = 2 (the largest Tj) when (1− 2pimin)ea < 1. We
can now see a convenient value for a, namely
a = − log (1− pimin) =⇒ E [exp(aTj)] = jpimin
jpimin − pimin =
j
j − 1
=⇒ E [exp(aT−1)] =
n∏
i=2
j
j − 1 = n
A short analytic exercise proves that a = − log (1− pimin) ≥ pimin, so the denominator of (*)
can be bounded as:
exp(a(1 + C/2)pi−1minHn) ≥ exp((1 + C/2)Hn) ≥ n1+C/2
and finally
P
[
T−1 ≥ (C/2)Hnpi−1min
] ≤ n−C/2
Now, taking a union bound over the above two probabilities gets the desired result.
Remark B.2. The proof above hints that it is likely not possible to qualitatively improve the above
concentration much. Indeed, the largest geometric wait time T1 is larger than Cpi
−1
minHn with proba-
bility very close to n−C , so this single wait time can push that entire Tub above its expectation with
only polynomially small probability. We expect a similar phenomenon with T itself.
We also need to reason about the lower tail of coupon collector. Our result for the lower tail is
significantly coarser, because the simple lower bounds we can put on the geometric waiting times
no longer closely align with the main “driving factor” of the coupon collector (the wait time to
collect the last tier). Nonetheless, these bounds suffice for our later purposes.
Proposition B.3. For any 0 < c < 1 and any η > 0, we have
P
[
T ≤ c  ·α
αmax
n lnn
]
≤ O(nc−1−η)
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Proof. By A.1, we can write T =
∑n
i=1 τ
(i), where τ (i) is a geometric random variable with param-
eter pi, and pi ≤ (n− i+ 1)pimax. Note that for n− i+ 1 > pi−1max, this upper bound on pi is greater
than 1. We simply ignore these terms to get a lower bound: T  Tlb for
Tlb :=
1/pimax∑
j=1
Tj , where Tj ∼ Geo(jpimax) are independent
(where we change the index of summation for convenience). We now apply a Chernoff bound to
get a lower tail bound on Tlb.
We have
P
[
Tlb ≤ cpi−1maxHpi−1max
]
= P
[
e−aTlb ≥ exp(−acpi−1maxHpi−1max)
]
≤ exp(acpi−1maxHpi−1max)E
[
e−aTlb
]
(*)
A calculation reveals
E
[
e−aTj
]
=
jpimax
jpimax + ea − 1 ≤
jpimax
jpimax + a
since ea − 1 ≥ a. Now set a = pimax, and the expectation in (*) can be bounded as
E
[
e−aTlb
] ≤ pi−1max∏
j=1
j
j + 1
≤ 1
pi−1max
(†)
In total,
P
[
Tlb ≤ cpi−1maxHpi−1max
]
≤ exp(cHpi−1max)pi−1max
= O(pic−1max) = O(n
c−1)
Noting that
pi−1maxHpi−1max =
 ·α
αmax
n
(
lnn+ log
 ·α
αmax
+O(1)
)
= (1−O(1/ lnn))  ·α
αmax
n log n
yields the desired result for any η > 0.
We can also modify the above proof to show the following, which is needed at one point for a
technical reason:
Corollary B.4. For any pimax = Θ(1/n) and constant k, let T
′
lb =
∑1/pimax
j=k Tj, where Tj are
independent draws from Geo(jpimax). Then for all 0 < c < 1 and η > 0, we have
P
[
T ′lb ≤ c
 ·α
αmax
n lnn
]
≤ O(nc−1−η).
Proof. The only change we need to make is that the index of the product in (†) starts at k, instead
of 1. This increases the bound for E
[
e−aT ′lb
]
by a factor of k = O(1), the thus the final probability
by a factor of k = O(1).
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B.1 Concentration around the mean
In this subsection, we upper bound the variance of the coupon collector process in order to get
(fairly weak) concentration results around the mean. This is actually not needed for any of our
other results, because once we start reasoning about DA (without re-proposals), we bound the
variance in the total number of proposals in a different way. We include this result out of any
possible interest.
Proposition B.5. For any  > 0,
T = (1± ) ·α
αmin
n lnn
with probability approaching 1.
Proof. It will suffice to calculate a crude upper bound for the variance of T and apply Chebyshev’s
inequality. As shown in A.1, we have T =
∑n
i=1 τ
(i), where τ (i) is some geometrically distributed
random variable with success parameter pi at least (n− i+ 1)pimin. Thus, the variance of τ (i) is
1− pi
p2i
≤ (n− i+ 1)−2pi−2min
We would like to conclude saying that
∑n
i=1 τ
(i) is at most
∑n
i=1 Var(τ
(i)). However, this would
not take into account the variation in wait times we experience due to the different orders in which
we might collect the distinct coupons. Thus, in the below we condition on the order in which
coupons are collected and use a trick related to the “law of total variance”.
Let P = (c1, c2, . . . , cn) denote the random variable giving the order in which the distinct
coupons are collected. Using the law of total expectation and the definition of (conditional) variance,
the following holds for any random variables T, P :
Var(T ) = E
[
T 2
]− E [T ]2
= E
[
E
[
T 2|P ]]− E [T ]2
= E
[
Var(T |P ) + E [T |P ]2
]
− E [T ]2 . (*)
Conditioned on P , the values of each τ (i) are independent, so we have
Var(T |P ) =
n∑
i=1
Var(τ (i)|P ) ≤
n∑
i=1
(n− i+ 1)−2pi−2min = O(pi−2min) = O(n2).
Moreover, as discussed in the proof of A.1, regardless of the value of P the conditional distribution
T |P is statistically dominated by Tub, which has expectation
E [T |P ] ≤ E [Tub] = pi−1minHn
On the other hand, proposition A.4 shows that
E [T ] ≥ (1−O(1/ lnn))pi−1minHn
overall.
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Plugging the above bounds into (*) gets us
Var(T ) ≤ O(n2) +
(
1− (1−O(1/ lnn))2)(pi−1minHn)2
= O(n2) +O(1/ lnn)(pi−1minHn)
2
= O(n2 lnn)
Let f(n) = ( ·α/αmin)n lnn. Chebyshev’s inequality finally tells us, for n large enough that
|f(n)− E [X] | = O(1/ lnn)f(n) < (/2)f(n), we have
P [T 6= (1± )f(n)] ≤ P [|T − E [T ] | ≥ (/2)f(n)]
=
O(n2 lnn)
(/2)2f(n)2
= O
(
1/(2 lnn)
)
C Missing proof on the expected total number of proposals
Theorem 3.8. Let S be the total number of proposals made in DA with tiers of women ,α, and
arbitrary constant tiers on the men. We have
E [S] =
(
1−O(ln2 n/n))E [T ] = (1±O(1/ lnn)) ·α
αmin
n lnn.
Proof. Because S  T , it suffices to prove a lower bound on E [S].
Consider running deferred acceptances with re-proposals to derive the random variable T . We
can write S = T −R, where R = ∑Ti=1Ri and Ri is the indicator of whether the ith proposal is a
repeat. By 3.6, with probability 1 − 1/n2, no man makes more than O(ln2 n) proposals. Let this
event be denote by E. We thus have
E [Ri|E] ≤ αmax ·O(ln
2 n)
αminn
= O
(
ln2 n
n
)
=⇒ E [R|E] = O(ln2 n/n) · E [T |E] .
To complete the proof, we use the fact that T is not heavy-tailed enough for the low probability
event E to effect its expectation much.
Specifically, proposition B.1 shows that there exists a constant K such that, for each C =
1, 2, . . ., we have P [T ≥ (1 + C)Kn lnn] ≤ O(n−C/2). Let B be the event that T ≤ 5Kn lnn, and
for each integer i ≥ 5, let Bi be the event that iKn lnn ≤ T ≤ (i+ 1)Kn lnn. We have
E
[
T1[E¯ ∨ B¯]] ≤ E [T1[E¯ ∧B]]+ ∞∑
i=5
E [T1[Bi]]
≤ 1
n2
· (5Kn lnn) +
∞∑
i=5
O(n−i/2)(1 + i)Kn lnn = o(1)
Thus, all told we we have
E [R] ≤ (1−O(1/n2))E [R|E ∧B] + E [R1[E¯ ∨ B¯]]
≤ (1− 1/n2) ·O
(
ln2 n
n
)
· 5Kn lnn+ E [T1[E¯ ∨ B¯]] = O(ln3 n)
=⇒ E [S] = E [T ]− E [R] ≥ (1−O(ln2 n/n))E [T ] .
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D Reaching smooth matching states
Recall definition 4.1, which defines µ−L as the state of deferred acceptance after letting all men
outside of set L propose until they find a match, and 4.2, which calls µ−L smooth if at most
C1n lnn proposals have been made overall, and at most n
1−C2 women have received fewer than
C3 lnn proposals.
Proposition 4.3. Let L = {m1,m2} be any pair of men. After running deferred acceptance, µ−L
is smooth with probability 1− n−Ω(1).
Proof. By 3.4 and B.1, there exists a C1 such that the total number of proposals made in DA is
C1n lnn with probability 1− 1/n. Thus, the same will hold before the men in L propose.
Now, consider running deferred acceptance with re-proposals with all men not in L, and let
T ′ denote the total number of proposals. Observe that this process will terminate as soon as
n − 2 distinct women receive proposals. Thus, by generalizing the standard argument used to
bound the coupon collector with equal probabilities, we can write T ′ =
∑n−2
i=1 τ
(i), where τ (i) are
geometrically distributed random variables with parameter at most (n− i+ 1)pimax (although the
parameter depends on the order in which coupons are collected). A detailed description of this
is given in A.1. We thus know that T ′  T ′lb, where T ′lb =
∑1/pimax
j=3 Tj for independent draws
Tj ∼ Geo(jpimax) (similarly to B.3). Corollary B.4 shows that, up to constants, the same lower tail
that held in B.3 also applies here. In particular, there is a constant c such that the total number
of proposals is at least cn lnn with probability 1− 1/n1/2.
Now, consider the first cn lnn proposals of deferred acceptance with re-proposals, and let X
denote the number of proposals received by a fixed woman w. Each draw is random and independent
over the women, and we can assume without loss of generality that w belongs to the bottom tier
of women. Thus w is selected each draw with probability pimin and E [X] = pimincn lnn = O(lnn).
As the draws are independent, a standard “multiplicative Chernoff bound” I.2 applies, and gets us
that
P
[
X ≤ 1
2
E [X]
]
≤ exp
(
−E [X]
4
)
= n−D
for some constant D. Thus, the expected number of women with fewer than E [X] /2 proposals is
thus at most n1−D. Thus Markov’s inequality tells us that, for cn lnn proposals uniformly drawn
from W,
P
[
more than n1−D/2 women have fewer than E [X] /2 proposals
]
≤ n
1−D
n1−D/2
= n−D/2
As deferred acceptance with re-proposals runs for cn lnn proposals with probability 1 − n1/2, we
get that the number of women with fewer than E [X] /2 proposals (in deferred acceptance with
re-proposals) is less than n1−C2 with probability 1−O(n−D/2), where C2 = D/2.
To simply relate the above to ordinary DA, we use proposition D.1 (proven below). Consider
converting the run of deferred acceptance with re-proposals into a run of DA by ignoring repeated
proposals. By proposition D.1, with probability 1 − O˜(1/n), every woman has at least 1/3 of
the proposals in DA as she got in deferred acceptance with re-proposals. Thus, with probability
1−O(n−D/2) overall, at most n1−C2 women received fewer than E [X] /6 = C3 lnn proposals.
Proposition D.1. Consider deferred acceptance with re-proposals. With probability 1 − O˜(1/n),
no man proposes to a single woman more than 3 times.
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Proof. Proposition 3.6 states that, with probability 1 − 1/n, no man makes more than O(ln2 n)
proposals in DA. Observe that the proof of theorem 3.5 would go through even if the last man
m∗ sampled women with replacement, and thus proposition 3.6 holds for deferred acceptance with
re-proposals as well. For a fixed man-woman pair (m,w), the probability that m proposes to w at
least 3 times is at most (
O(ln2 n)
3
)
pi3max = O
(
ln6 n
n3
)
.
Taking a union bound over the n2 pairs (m,w) gets the desired result.
E Expected rank in smooth matching states
For this entire section, consider a fixed pair of men L = {m1,m2} with public scores β1 and β2.
We consider all men other than L proposing until they find a match, and we make the following
assumption on µ−L, the state of DA before m1,m2 propose:
Assumption E.1. For the entirety of section E, fix µ−L and assume µ−L is smooth.
In particular, all men other than {m1,m2} have been accepted, we assume that at most C1n lnn
total proposals have been made, and we assume all but a n−C2 fraction of women have received at
least C3 lnn proposals. Denote these women by Whigh, and the remaining women by Wlow. Denote
the distribution induced by sampling from Whigh proportionally to public scores by Whigh (and
similarly with Wlow). We use EL [] to denote taking an expectation over the random process of
m1,m2 proposing in DA after starting from state µ−L.
For this section, we assume without loss of generality that all βi are rescaled to be at least 1
(e.g. we can simply set βmin = 1). For any woman w, recall that Γw denotes the sum of the public
scores of men who have proposed to w before m1 or m2 start proposing. For β ≥ 1, define
pw(β) :=
β
β + Γw
, p(β) := E
w∼W
[pw(β)] .
That is, pw(β) is the probability that a woman w in µ−L accepts a proposal from a man with public
score β, and p(β) is the probability that a woman randomly drawn according to men’s preferences
accepts such a proposal.
Our plan is to show that the number of proposals each mi makes is closely related to a geometric
random variable with parameter p(βi). We start off by calculating the order of magnitude of p(β),
and studying how p(β) scales between β1 and β2.
E.1 Scaling of probability of acceptance
Proposition E.2. For any constant β, we have p(β) = Θ(1/ lnn).
Proof. Recall that the total number of proposals in µ−L is at most C1n lnn. Thus, 1n
∑
w∈W Γw ≤
βmaxC1 lnn. Note the fact that that sampling according to W only affects the average by constant
factors. In particular, we have
E
w∼W
[Γw] =
1
n ·α
∑
w∈W
α(w)Γw ≤ αmin
nαmax
∑
w∈W
Γw ≤ O(lnn).
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Observe that the function f(x) = β/(β + x) is convex. Applying Jensen’s inequality to the calcu-
lation of p(β), we get
p(β) ≥ β
β + Ew∼W [Γw]
≥ O
(
1
lnn
)
Because tier weights αi are constant, when we sample w ∼ W, the probability of drawing a
woman from Wlow is at most αmaxn
1−C2/(αminn) = O(n−C2). For w ∈ Whigh, we have pw(β) ≤
O(1/ lnn). Thus, overall we get
p(β) =
(
1−O(n−C2)) E
w∼Whigh
[pw(β)] +O(n
−C2) E
w∼Wlow
[pw(β)]
≤ (1−O(n−C2))O(1/ lnn) +O(n−C2) = O(1/ lnn)
Proposition E.3. For any constant β > 1, we have
p(β) =
(
1−O(1/ lnn))βp(1).
Proof. Observe that pw(β) ≤ βpw(1) pointwise for each w, and thus taking expectations, p(β) ≤
βp(1).
On the other hand, if Γw > 0, we have
pw(β) = β · 1
1 + Γw
· 1 + Γ
β + Γ
= βpw(1)
(
1− β − 1
β + Γw
)
≥ βpw(1)
(
1−O(1/Γw)
)
.
Applying the law of total probability to both p(1) and p(β), we have
p(β) =
(
1−O(n−C2)) E
w∼Whigh
[
β
(
1−O(1/ log n))pw(1)]+O(n−C2) E
w∼Wlow
[pβ(w)]
≥ β(1−O(1/ log n)) E
w∼Whigh
[pw(1)] (*)
We can formally show that p(1) is close to Ew∼Whigh [pw(1)] as follows:
p(1) =
(
1−O(n−C2)) E
w∼Whigh
[pw(1)] +O(n
−C2) E
w∼Wlow
[pβ(w)]
≤ (1−O(n−C2)) E
w∼Whigh
[pw(1)] +O(n
−C2)
=⇒ E
w∼Whigh
[pw(1)] ≥ p(1)−O(n
−C2)
1−O(n−C2) ≥
(
1 +O(n−C2/2)
)
p(1).
Where the last inequality uses the fact that p(1) ≥ Ω(1/ lnn). Thus, plugging into (*), we get
p(β) ≥ β(1−O(1/ log n))p(1).
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E.2 The expected number of proposals made
We start by bounding the order of magnitude of the number of proposals a man needs to make,
even if the matching state has changed a noticeable amount from the initial state µ−L.
Proposition E.4. Consider any matching state (µ, P ) (with any number of remaining unmatched
men) in which fewer than C4n lnn proposals have been made overall, for some constant C4. Suppose
mi has proposed to fewer than n/4 women total, and let r
contd
i be the number of additional proposals
mi will make before DA terminates. Then E
[
rcontdi
] ≤ O(lnn).
Proof. Consider letting all men other than mi propose until all are accepted by some woman.
Certainly this is statistically dominated by the random variable T giving the total number of
proposals when starting from an empty matching state. Thus, the number of additional proposals
is C1n lnn with probability 1−O(1/n). Now, we track the probability of acceptance of mi as in 3.5,
but this time we consider the expectation, not the concentration.
Let K denote the number of times mi is tentatively accepted by some woman. Whenever
a man m other than mi is making a proposal, consider the event that m proposes to either an
unmatched woman, or the current match w of mi. The probability that, in this event, the proposal
goes to w is at most the constant q = αmax/(αmin + αmax). Note that mi cannot be kicked back
out from w unless w receives another proposal before the unmatched woman gets a proposal.
Thus, P [K ≥ k + 1|K ≥ k] ≤ q, and K is statistically dominated by a geometric distribution with
parameter q.
Now, for k = 1, . . . ,K, let Pk denote the number of proposals m makes between his (k − 1)th
tentative acceptance and his kth tentative acceptance. For any specific one of these proposals, let
W ∗ denote the set of women mi has not yet proposed to, and also the weighted distribution over
these women. Let Γw denote the total weight of proposals that a woman w ∈W ∗ has received before
that proposal. As long as there have been at most O(n lnn) proposals overall, and mi has proposed
to fewer than n/2 women, we have Ew∼W∗ [Γw] ≤ O(lnn) and Ew∼W∗ [βi/(βi + Γw)] ≥ Ω(1/ lnn)
by Jensen’s inequality. Thus, in these cases Pk is statistically dominated by a geometric distribution
with parameter Ω(1/ lnn).
With probability 1− 1/n, by 3.5 we know that mi makes fewer than O(ln2 n) proposals, so the
above bounds on K and each Pk hold. With the remaining probability, simply use the upper bound
of n proposals. Thus, all told we have
E
[
rcontdi
]
= E
[
K∑
k=1
Pk
]
≤ (1−O(1/n))(1/q)O(lnn) +O(1/n) · n = O(lnn).
We now turn to a more fine-grained study of the number of proposals m1 and m2 make, denoted
r1 and r2. We reason about the random process of DA starting from µ−L by separating it into two
phases:
• Phase (1). First, consider m1 proposing until his first acceptance (possibly kicking out
man m′1), say by woman w1. Next let m2 propose until his first acceptance (possibly kicking
out man m′2 (where m′2 may equal m1)), say by woman w2. Let riniti denote the number of
proposals mi makes during this phase.
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• Phase (2). Afterwards, run DA as normal, staring with men L′ = {m′1,m′2} proposing. Let
rresti denote the number of proposals mi makes during this phase (or set r
rest
i = 0 if mi ends
up staying at wi in the final matching).
Note that ri = r
init
i + r
rest
i .
Now, for each mi separately, consider the following random process: each time step, sample a
w ∼ W independently and with replacement, and have w accept mi with probability βi/(βi + Γw)
independently each time. For i = 1, 2, let rgeoi denote the number of draws until the first acceptance.
Then rgeoi is distributed exactly according to Geo(p(βi)), so proposition E.3 immediately implies
the following:
Proposition E.5. For i = 1, 2, we have
E [rgeoi ] =
(
1 +O(1/ lnn)
) 1
βip(1)
.
Note that the random process we consider for rgeoi is slightly different than deferred acceptance
with re-proposals, because in deferred acceptance women never accept a proposal from a man who
has already proposed to them. Nonetheless, we will be able to show that in expectation, rgeoi is only
a o(1) additive constant away from riniti . The core reason for this is the following: by proposition 3.6,
m1 and m2 make fewer than O(ln
2 n) proposals with very high probability. In particular, this is
true during phase (1). Thus, there is at most a O(ln4 n/n) probability that m1 and m2 propose
to the same woman, or make a repeat proposal themselves, during phase (1). So phase (1) can
contribute at most O(log6 n/n) to the expectation in this case. In any other case, the distribution
of proposals in phase (1) is distributed exactly as in rgeoi .
Proposition E.6. For i = 1, 2, we have
E
L
[
riniti
]
= E [rgeoi ]± o(1)
Proof. In phase (1), the changes we need to make to turn the distribution of rgeoi into the distribution
of riniti are exactly the following:
• If m1 or m2 were rejected by a woman they already proposed to, that proposal should be
ignored. If m1 or m2 were accepted by a woman they already proposed to, that proposal
should also be ignored, and mi should continue proposing to more women.
• If m2 proposes to a woman who m1 proposed to during rinit1 , the probability that m2 is
accepted should change from β2/(β2 + Γw) to β2/(β2 + β1 + Γw)
Thus, differences arise between rgeoi and r
init
i only when a repeated proposal is made.
With probability 1 − O(1/n2), neither m1 nor m2 make more than C ln2 n proposals (even in
deferred acceptance with re-proposals), for some constant C. Thus, the probability that any pair
of proposals is repeated is at most(
2C ln2 n
2
)
npi2max = O
(
ln4 n
n
)
.
If any of above corrections need to be made, imagine stopping running rgeoi and run ordinary
deferred acceptance from the current matching state7. In this case, we still know by proposition 3.6
7 Formally, this describes a coupling of the joint distributions of (rinit1 , r
init
2 ) and (r
geo
1 , r
geo
2 ) in which each joint
distribution differs with probability O˜(1/n).
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that ri = O(ln
2 n) with probability 1− 1/n2. Thus, all told we have
E
[
riniti
]
= E [rgeoi ] +O
(
log4 n
n
)
·O(ln2 n) +O
(
1
n2
)
· n = E [rgeoi ] + o(1).
We now separately consider phase (2). During phase (2), between times where m1 or m2 are
proposing, many other proposals might be made by different men, changing the effective values of
Γw and thus the probability that a proposal by m1 or m2 is accepted. Thus, we’d like to say that
the rank of m1 and m2 is approximately their rank in phase (1).
Indeed, it turns out we have E
[
rresti
]
= O(1). The proof sketch is the following: Because at
most a n−C2 fraction of women are in Wlow, there is a O(ln2 n/nC2) chance that m1 or m2’s first
acceptance is to a woman in Wlow. Thus, this case can contribute at most poly log n/n
C2 to the
expectation. In the other case, a woman in Whigh has accepted m1 or m2, and she will only reject
him with probability O(1/ lnn) (to prove this, we will use the fact that a proposal is at most a
constant times less likely to go to an unmatched woman than the match of m1 or m2, so these
women won’t receive too many additional proposals). This probability is non-negligible, however,
proposition E.4 says that the number of additional proposals in phase (2) has expectation at most
O(lnn). Thus, phase (2) contributes O(1) proposals in expectation.
Proposition E.7. For i = 1, 2, we have
E
L
[
rresti
]
= O(1)
Proof. Phase (2) starts with a set of at most two men L′ = {m′1,m′2} unmatched. During this phase,
we no longer need to very carefully track the relationship between the acceptance probabilities and
the initial matching state µ−L. Thus, we can consider each mi separately for i = 1, 2. For j 6= i,
let mj propose until he finds a match, and recall that this add fewer than C1n lnn proposals with
probability 1− 1/n2.
Again, with probability 1 − 1/n2, we get that mi makes fewer than C ln2 n proposals, so the
probability that he made even a single proposal to one of the n1−C2 women in Wlow is at most
1
n2
+ C ln2 n · αmaxn
1−C2
αminn
= O
(
ln2 n
nC2
)
.
In particular, the probability that mi matched to a woman in Wlow is O
(
ln2 n/nC2
)
.
Consider the case where mi matched to women wi in Whigh. Let this event be denoted H. Let
the (at most) two unmatched women in this case be wu1 and w
u
2 . For any subsequent proposal in
DA, consider the event P that a proposal goes to any woman in {wi, wu1 , wu2}. Conditioned on a
proposal landing in P , there is a constant lower bound q = αmin/(3αmax) on the probability that
a proposal goes to wu1 and w
u
2 . Let the number of proposals to wi before both w
u
1 and w
u
2 see a
proposal (and thus DA terminates) be denoted K. For j = 1, . . . ,K, let Xj be the event that wi
accepts the jth proposal made to her. Then the probability that wi accepts a new proposal can be
upper bounded as follows:
E
K
[P [X1 ∪ . . . ∪XK ]] ≤ E
K
[P [X1] + . . .+ P [XK ]] ≤ E [K] ·O(1/ lnn) = O(1/ lnn),
where we observe that the expectation of K is constant8.
8 One can formally verify this as follows: Let K′ be defined by iteratively sampling over {wi, wu1 , wu2 }, where each
wui is sampled with probability q and wi with probability 1− 2q, and letting K′ be the number of draws needed until
wu1 and w
u
2 have both been sampled. Then certainly K  K′. But K′ can be written as G1 +G2, where G1 ∼ Geo(2q)
and G2 ∼ Geo(q). Thus, E [K′] = 3/(2q) = O(1).
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Moreover, observe that the total number of remaining proposals made to any woman is statisti-
cally dominated by G1 +G2, where G1 ∼ Geo(2pimin) and G2 ∼ Geo(pimin). Thus, with probability
1−1/n2, the total number of remaining proposals is O(n lnn), so proposition E.4 applies, and even
if mi is rejected from wi, he makes O(lnn) additional proposals in expectation. Thus, in event H
we have
E
[
rresti |E
]
= O
(
1
n2
)
· n+O
(
1
lnn
)
·O(lnn) = O(1)
All told, we have
E
[
rresti
]
= O
(
1
n2
)
· n+O
(
ln2 n
nC2
)
·O(ln2 n) +
(
1−O
(
ln2 n
nC2
))
E
[
rresti |E
]
= O(1).
Finally, combining propositions E.5, E.6 and E.7 gets the main result of this subsection.
Proposition 4.4. Suppose µ−L is smooth, and let r1 and r2 be the ranks of m1 and m2 after
running DA with m1 and m2 starting from µ−L. We have
EL[r1] =
(
1±O(1/ lnn))β2
β1
ELr2.
where we use EL [] to denote taking an expectation over the random process of m1,m2 proposing in
DA after starting from state µ−L.
Proof. By proposition E.2, we have E [rgeoi ] = Θ(lnn), so
E
L
[ri] = E
[
riniti
]
+ E
[
rresti
]
= E [rgeoi ] +O(1)
=
(
1 +O(1/ lnn)
) 1
βip(1)
.
Thus both EL [r1] and EL [r2] relate to 1/p(1) as follows:(
1 +O(1/ lnn)
)−1
β1E
L
[r1] =
1
p(1)
=
(
1 +O(1/ lnn)
)−1
β2E
L
[r2] ,
which proves our result.
E.3 The covariance in the number of proposals
We continue to reason about ri = r
init
i + r
rest
i for i = 1, 2, as defined in E.2. Now, we are
interested in their joint distribution, and whether there is significant correlation in r1 and r2. In
particular, we want to show that E [r1r2] ≈ E [r1]E [r2]. We find that the correlation is indeed
lower order, for similar reasons to those exploited above: most of the expected value of r1r2 comes
from rinit1 r
init
2 , i.e. proposals in phase (1), and the two men in L only interfere with each other in
phase (1) with probability poly log n/n.
We have
E
L
[r1r2] = E
L
[
rinit1 r
init
2 + r
init
1 r
rest
2 + r
rest
1 r
init
2 + r
rest
1 r
rest
2
]
.
We proceed to separately reason about these contributions. We find that rinit1 r
init
2 has the bulk of
the contribution, while all other terms are lower order.
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Proposition E.8. We have
E
[
rinit1 r
init
2
]
= E [r1]E [r2]±O(lnn)
Proof. We showed in proposition E.6 that jointly, you only need to change the distribution of
(rinit1 , r
init
2 ) from that of (r
geo
1 , r
geo
2 ) with probability O(ln
4 n/n). Moreover, with probability 1 −
O(1/n3), by proposition 3.6 both r1 and r2 are at most O(ln
2 n), so we get
E
[
rinit1 r
init
2
]
= E [rgeo1 r
geo
2 ]±O
(
ln4 n
n
)
·O(ln4 n) + 1
n3
· n2 = E [rgeo1 rgeo2 ]± o(1).
Moreover, rgeoi are independent, and by propositions E.6 and E.7, we have E [r
geo
i ] = E [ri]±O(1).
Thus,
E [rgeo1 r
geo
2 ] = E [r
geo
1 ]E [r
geo
2 ] =
(
E [r1]±O(1)
)(
E [r2]±O(1)
)
= E [r1]E [r2]±O(E [r1] + E [r2]).
To complete our proof that the covariance of r1 and r2 is o(ln
2 n), it will suffice to show that
the remaining terms of are O(ln3/2 n). While it may be possible to improve this to O(lnn), the
proof of our bound is very simple, largely due to the following variation of proposition 3.5:
Proposition E.9. For i = 1, 2, we have ri ≤ O(ln3/2 n) with probability at least 1− exp(−
√
lnn).
Proof. For j 6= i, consider letting mj propose until he finds a match. The number of total proposals
(from all men) this requires is statistically dominated by Geo(pimin), and thus less than O(n lnn)
with probability 1−1/n. In this case, at most O(n lnn) proposals have been made in total when mi
starts proposing, so proposition 3.5 holds as written. The only change we need to make to achieve
our result is that, in point 3, there exists a constant K such that the chance mi makes more than
K ln3/2 n proposals is bounded by(
1−O(1/ lnn))K ln3/2 n ≤ exp(− ln1/2 n)
Proposition E.10. For i 6= j, we have
E
[
riniti r
rest
j
]
= O(ln3/2 n)
Proof. Let E denote the event that riniti ≤ O(ln3/2 n). By E.9, we know E holds with probability
1− exp(−√lnn). Now, image letting mi and mj propose in phase (1), then letting mi find a match
in phase (2). Because riniti and r
rest
j occur during different phases of the algorithm, and we condition
on riniti not being too large, we can separately reason about r
rest
j (without, for example, worrying
about its effect on rresti ).
With probability 1− 1/n2, we know that the total number of proposals required for before mi
finds a match is O(n lnn) additional proposals. Using this, it is not hard to check that the proof
of E.7 goes through conditioned on event E, and thus E
[
rrestj
∣∣E] = O(1). Even if E does not hold,
by 3.6, with probability 1− 1/n3 both m1 and m2 make O(ln2 n) proposals. Thus, all told we have
E
[
riniti r
rest
j
] ≤ (1− exp(−√lnn)) ·O(ln3/2 n)E [rrestj ∣∣E]
+ exp(−
√
lnn)
(
1− 1/n3)O(ln2 n) ·O(ln2 n) + 1
n3
n · n
= O(ln3/2 n) ·O(1) + o(1)
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Proposition E.11. We have
E
[
rrest1 r
rest
2
]
= O(lnn)
Proof. The joint distribution of rrest1 and r
rest
2 is difficult to reason about, because (unlike in the
case of rinit1 and r
rest
2 ) both men have to take turns proposing during phase (2). Thus, this proof
focuses on generalizing the arguments of E.7 to show that the product rrest1 r
rest
2 is nonzero with
probability at most O(1/ ln2 n).
To this end, let w1, w2 be the tentative matches of m1,m2 at the end of phase (1), and let
wu1 , w
u
2 be the unmatched women. Suppose w1 and w2 are both in Whigh. As we showed in E.7, this
occurs with probability 1− O(ln4 n/nC2). Recall that women in Whigh will accept a new proposal
with probability at most O(1/ lnn).
For any subsequent proposal in DA, consider the event P that a proposal goes to any woman
in {w1, w2, wu1 , wu2}. Conditioned on a proposal landing in P , there is a constant lower bound
q = αmin/(4αmax) on the probability that a proposal goes to w
u
i for i = 1, 2. Before both w
u
1 and
wu2 see a proposal (and thus DA terminates), let the number of proposals to w1 be denoted K1 and
the number of proposals to w2 be K2. For i = 1, 2 and j = 1, . . . ,K, let X
i
j be the event that wi
accepts the jth proposal made to her. Then the probability that both w1 and w2 a new proposal
can be upper bounded as follows:
E
K1,K2
[
P
[(
X11 ∪ . . . ∪X1K1
) ∩ (X21 ∪ . . . ∪X2K2)]]
= E
K1,K2
[
P
[(
X11 ∪ . . . ∪X1K1
)] · P [(X21 ∪ . . . ∪X2K2)]]
≤ E
K1,K2
[(
P
[
X11
]
+ . . .+ P
[
X1K1
] ) · (P [X21]+ . . .+ P [X2K2] )]
≤ E
K1,K2
[
K1K2 ·O(1/ ln2 n)
]
≤ E [K1K2] ·O(1/ ln2 n) = O(1/ ln2 n),
where we use the fact that whether w1 or w2 accepts proposals is independent, and the observation
that the expectation of K1K2 is constant
9.
We showed above that with probability
(
1−O(ln4 n/n−C2))(1−O(1/ ln2 n)), either m1 or m2
remain at their tentative match from phrase (1), and rrest1 r
rest
2 = 0. By proposition E.9, even if m1
and m2 both leave their tentative match from phase (1), with probability 1− exp(−
√
lnn), each of
them make at most O(ln3/2 n) additional proposals. Even if this fails, by proposition 3.6, m1 and
m2 make O(ln
2 n) proposals with probability 1− 1/n3. All told, we have
E
[
rrest1 r
rest
2
]
=
(
1−O(ln4 n/n−C2)) ·O( 1
ln2 n
)(
O(ln3/2 n)
)2
+
(
O(ln4 n/n−C2) + exp(−
√
lnn)
)(
O(ln2 n)
)2
+
1
n3
n2
= O(lnn)
Combining propositions E.8, E.10, and E.11, we get our main result on covariance in smooth
matching states.
9 One can formally verify this as follows: Let K′ be defined by iteratively sampling over {w1, w2, wu1 , wu2 }, where
each wui is sampled with probability q and each wi with probability 1/2− q, and letting K′ be the number of draws
needed until wu1 and w
u
2 have both been sampled. Then certainly Ki ≤ K1 + K2  K′. But K′ can be written as
G1 +G2, where G1 ∼ Geo(2q) and G2 ∼ Geo(q). Thus, E [K1K2] ≤ E
[
(K′)2
] ≤ Var(G1 +G2) = O(1).
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Proposition 4.5. Suppose µ−L is smooth, and let r1 and r2 be the ranks of m1 and m2 after
running DA with m1 and m2 starting from µ−L. Then we have Cov(ri, rj) = O(ln3/2 n).
Proof. We have
Cov(ri, rj) = E [rirj ]− E [ri]E [rj ] = ±O(lnn) +O(ln3/2 n) +O(lnn) = O(ln3/2 n)
F Missing proofs for the expected rank of men
First, we prove two crucial lemmas.
Proposition 4.6. Let ri and rj denote the rank of a man in tiers i and j. Then we have
E [ri] =
(
1±O(1/ lnn))βj
βi
E [rj ] .
Proof. Let all men other than L = {mi,mj} propose, for mi in tier i and mj in tier j. By
proposition 4.3, with probability 1−n−Ω(1), the matching state µ−L is smooth, and proposition 4.4
applies.
First, we verify that conditioning on µ−L being smooth cannot change the expectation of rj
much. With probability 1− 1/n2, mj makes at most O(ln2 n) proposals, so
E [rj ] =
1
n2
· n+ n−Ω(1) ·O(ln2 n) + (1− n−Ω(1))E [rj∣∣ µ−L is smooth]
=⇒ E [rj∣∣ µ−L is smooth] = (1 + n−Ω(1))E [rj ]− o(1).
Now we can relate this to ri using 4.4.
E [ri] =
1
n2
· n+ n−Ω(1) ·O(ln2 n) + (1− n−Ω(1)) E
µ−L
[
E
L
[ri] | µ−L is smooth
]
= o(1) + E
µ−L
[(
1±O(1/ lnn))βj
βi
E
L
[rj ]
∣∣∣ µ−L is smooth] = (1±O(1/ lnn))βj
βi
E [rj ] .
Theorem 4.7. Let β−1 denote the vector (1/βi)i. For each tier j, the rank rj of men in tier j has
expectation
E [rj ] =
(
1±O(1/ lnn)) E [S]
(nδ · β)βj =
(
1±O(1/ lnn)) ·α
αmin
· 1
(δ · β−1) ·
lnn
βj
.
Proof. Let the number of tiers be k. Using theorem 3.8 and symmetry for men in the same tier,
we get the following:
(
1±O(1/ lnn)) ·α
αmin
n lnn = E [S] =
k∑
i=1
nδiE [ri]
=
k∑
i=1
nδi
βj
βi
(
1±O(1/ lnn))E [rj ]
=
(
1±O(1/ lnn))(nδ · β−1)βjE [rj ] ,
and the theorem follows.
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Now we prove our main theorem.
Theorem 4.8. For any tier j, let R
M
j = (δjn)
−1∑
m rm denote the average rank of men in tier j.
Then, for any  > 0,
R
M
j = (1± )
 ·α
αmin
· 1
(δ · β−1) ·
lnn
βj
with probability approaching 1 as n→∞.
Proof. Let r1, r2 be the ranks of an arbitrary pair of men L = {m1,m2}, both in tier j. To prove
the theorem, it will suffice to bound the covariance of r1 and r2 using 4.5. Recall from definition 4.1
that µ−L denotes the partial matching state excluding L. Let U be a random variable indicating
one of three things about µ−L: U = s if µ−L is smooth (this occurs with probability 1 − n−Ω(1)),
U = t if µ−L is not smooth but at most O(n lnn) total proposals have been made (this occurs with
probability n−Ω(1)), and U = c otherwise (this occurs with probability 1/n3 by proposition B.1).
The “law of total covariance” allows us to bound the total covariance of r1 and r2 by separately
consider the cases U = s, t, c. The first case is exactly proposition 4.5: Cov(r1, r2|U = s) ≤
O(ln3/2 n). The second cases uses the fact that (under the assumption that at most O(n lnn)
proposals have been made total) proposition 3.5 says that r1, r2 ≤ O(ln2 n) with probability 1−1/n3.
Thus, we have Cov(r1, r2|U = t) ≤ O(ln4 n) + 1n3 · n3 = O(ln4 n). The final case simply uses
r1, r2 ≤ n: Cov(r1, r2|U = c) ≤ n2. We also bound the variance of the random variable E [ri|U ]
for i = 1, 2. Because E [ri|U ] takes a constant value (E [ri|U = s]) with high probability, we have
Var
U
(E [ri|U ]) ≤ O(ln4 n) · 1nΩ(1) + n2 1n3 = o(1). All told, we get
Cov(r1, r2) ≤ E
U
[Cov(r1, r2|U)] + Cov
U
(E [r1|U ] ,E [rw|U ])
≤ O(ln3/2 n) + n−Ω(1) ·O(ln4 n) + 1
n3
· n2 + o(1) = O(ln3/2 n)
Additionally observe that, because ri ≤ O(ln2 n) with probability 1− 1/n3 (3.6 again), we have
Var(ri) ≤ O(ln4 n). Summing over the (δjn)2 pairs of men thus gets us
Var(R
M
j ) ≤
1
(δjn)2
(
(δjn) ·O(ln4 n) + (δjn)2 ·O(ln3/2 n)
)
= O(ln3/2 n)
Let f(n) =  ·α/(αminβjδ · β−1) lnn. Finally, Chebyshev’s inequality plus theorem 4.7 says
that for any  > 0 and n large enough, we have
P
[
R
M
j 6= (1± )f(n)
]
≤ P
[
|RMj − E
[
R
M
j
]
| ≥ (/2)f(n)
]
=
O(ln3/2 n)
(/2)2f(n)2
= O
(
1/(2
√
lnn)
)
G Proofs for expected rank of women
In this appendix, we prove our concentration results for the average rank of women in each tier.
First we prove the following basic lemma:
Proposition G.1. With probability 1 − O(1/ log n), the total number of re-proposals in deferred
acceptance with re-proposals is O(log4 n).
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Proof. By proposition B.1, we know there are O(n log n) proposals in deferred acceptance with re-
proposals with probability 1−1/n3. By corollary 3.6, with probability 1−1/n3, each man makes as
most O(log2 n) proposals, so in this case the probability that a proposal is a repeat is O(log2 n/n).
If either of the above do not hold, we assume the number of re-proposals can be as high as the
number of proposals overall, which is O(n log n) by proposition 3.2. Thus, the expected number of
re-proposals is at most
(
1− 1/n3)O( log2 n
n
)
·O(n log n) + (1/n3) ·O(n log n) = O(log3 n)
Thus Markov’s inequality tells us that, there are more than Ω(log4 n) re-proposals with probability
only 1/ log n.
Next, we fix some woman and consider the number of proposals she gets from each tier of men.
We also consider the total number of proposals received by the tier i which w is in (though we only
need a one sided bound for this).
Proposition G.2. Let Sj→i denote the total number of proposals made by men in tier j to women
in tier i. Furthermore, fix a woman w in tier i, and let Sj→w denote the number of proposals made
by men in tier j to w. For any  > 0, with probability 1−O(1/(2√lnn)), we have
Sj→i ≤ (1 + ) iαi
αmin
· δjβ
−1
j
δ · β−1n lnn
Sj→w = (1± ) αi
αmin
· δjβ
−1
j
δ · β−1 lnn
Proof. Let Sj denote the total number of proposals by men in tier j. By theorem 4.8,
Sj ≤ (1 + )Cjn lnn for Cj =  ·α
αmin
· δjβ
−1
j
δ · β−1
with probability 1 − O(1/(2√lnn)). Now, the marginal probability that an individual proposal
goes to some woman in tier i is iαi/( ·α). However, we still need to handle the fact that men do
not make repeat proposals.
Recall that by 3.6, with probability 1 − 1/n2 no man makes more than O(ln2 n) proposals.
So in this case, the probability that a proposal goes to tier j of women is always upper bounded
by iαi/( · α) + O(ln2 n/n). Thus, when this holds, the number of proposals going to tier j is
statistically dominated by the sum of K = (1+ )Cjn lnn independent Bernoulli trials with success
parameter p = iαi/( ·α) +O(ln2 n/n). Note that
Kp ≤ (1 + 2)Cj→in lnn for Cj→i = iαi
αmin
· δjβ
−1
j
δ · β−1
for n large enough. The concentration of this sum can be bounded with a standard application of
Chernoff I.2 to get
P [Sj→i ≥ (1 + )(Kp)] ≤ exp(−2(Kp)/3) = n−Ω(2 lnn).
For any  > 0, the above probability is o(1/
√
lnn), so with probability 1−O(1/(2√lnn)) overall,
we have
Sj→i ≥ (1 + 3)Cj→in lnn.
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For the second concentration result, we consider deferred acceptance with re-proposals. First
we prove the lower bound. Let Tj denote the number of proposals by men in tier j, and let Tj→w
be those which additionally go to woman w. By the same proof as 3.4, we have Sj  Tj . Thus, by
theorem 4.8, we have Tj ≥ (1− )Cjn lnn with probability 1−O(1/(2
√
lnn)).
Consider the first (1 − )Cjn lnn proposals by men in tier j in deferred acceptance with re-
proposals. There are i.i.d. and go to w with probability pii = αi/(n · α). The probability that w
gets less than (1 − )µ proposals, where µ := (1 − )piiCjn lnn = Θ(lnn), can be bounded with a
standard application of Chernoff I.2:
P [Tj→w ≤ (1− )µ] ≤ exp(−2µ/2) = n−Ω(2).
Now, with high probability, every man proposes to at most O(ln2 n) distinct women, by proposi-
tion 3.6. When this holds, among the first (1− )µ = O(lnn) proposals, the probability that even a
single one of those proposals is a repeat is O(ln3 n/n). Thus, with probability 1− O˜(1/n), we have
that w did not receive a single repeated proposals among her first (1− )µ. Thus, with probability
1− n−Ω(2), w received at least (1− )µ proposals in the first (1− )Cjn lnn proposals by men in
tier j. By 4.8, tier j makes this many proposals with probability 1−O(1/(2√lnn)), so overall
Sj→w ≥ (1− 2)piiCjn lnn = (1− 2) αi
αmin
· δjβ
−1
j
δ · β−1 lnn
with probability 1−O(1/(2√lnn)).
We now prove the upper bound of the second concentration result. By theorem 4.8 and
proposition G.1, we have Tj ≤ (1 + )Cjn lnn + O(log4 n) ≤ (1 + 2)Cjn lnn with probability
1 − O(1/(2√lnn)) − O(1/ log n). Consider the first (1 + 2)Cjn lnn proposals according to T ,
which go to w with probability pii. By another application of Chernoff I.2,
P [Sj→w ≥ (1 + )µ] ≤ P [Tj→w ≥ (1 + )µ] ≤ exp(−2µ/3) = n−Ω(2),
where µ = (1 + 2)Cjn lnn is the expected number of proposals to w in this process. Thus,
Sj→w ≤ (1 + 3)piiCjn lnn = (1 + 3) αi
αmin
· δjβ
−1
j
δ · β−1 lnn
with probability 1−O(1/(2√lnn)) overall.
Remark G.3. The proofs in appendix E reveal that, in some sense, the rank of a man m be-
haves like a geometric distribution (with parameter given by the probability of his proposal being
accepted). The number of proposals a woman w receive, on the other hand, intuitively behaves more
like a binomial distribution (with total number of trials given by the number of proposals overall,
and success probability given by pii = αi/(n ·α) for a woman in tier i). Indeed, a binomial distri-
bution with n lnn trials and success probability 1/n concentrates to (1± ) lnn with high probability,
and correspondingly we found above that the number of proposals received by the women actually
concentrates much better than the number of proposals made by the men.
Note, however, that the rank achieved by an individual woman does not concentrate. At some
intuitive level, this is because the rank of w behaves like an exponential distribution with rate pa-
rameter given by the weight of proposals Γw saw.
Next, we provide a lemma addressing the technicality mentioned in footnote 6 on page 14:
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Proposition G.4. With probability 1−O(1/n), no woman receives more than O(log n) proposals.
Proof. Fix a woman w, without loss of generality in the highest tier, and consider deferred ac-
ceptance with re-proposals. Note that the number of proposals w gets in this process statistically
dominates her number of proposals in DA. By proposition B.1, there exists a constant K such that
this process terminates before Kn lnn total proposals with probability 1− 1/n2.
Now, consider the first Kn lnn proposals in deferred acceptance with re-proposals, and let X
be the number of these proposals which went to w. Since proposals are independent, there is a
pimax chance that each one goes to w. Thus, the number of proposals w receives is a sum of Kn lnn
independent Bernoulli trials success pimax. Thus, E [X] = pimaxKn lnn = Θ(lnn), and a standard
Chernoff bound says that there exists a constant δ > 0 such that
P [X ≥ (1 + δ)E [X]] ≤ exp(−δE [X] /3) = 1/n2.
Thus, the number of proposals w receives is O(lnn) with probability 1−O(1/n2). Taking a union
bound over the n women, we have the result.
Finally we can prove our main result:
Theorem 5.1. Let R
W
i = (in)
−1∑
w∈Ti rw denote the average rank of women in tier i. For all
 > 0, we have
R
W
i = (1± )(δ · β)(δ · β−1)
αmin
αi
n
lnn
with probability approaching 1 as n→∞.
Proof. We study the rank that a woman w achieves by letting DA run until completion, then
generating the rest of w ranking based on the weight of proposals she received in DA. Specifically,
for each woman w let Γw be the sum of weights of all men who proposed to w. We denote by E [·|Γ]
the expectation conditioned on the state at the end of deferred acceptance. For each man m who
did not propose to w during DA, let am,w = 1 if m is preferred to w’s match once we generate
the rest of w’s preference list, and 0 otherwise. We have rw = 1 +
∑
m am,w, where the sum runs
over all men who did not propose to w during DA. Note that, for each man m with fitness β(m),
E [am,w] = β(m)/(β(m) + Γw), by 2.3. However, am,w are not independent, for instance because if
many men are ranked worse than w’s match, this is likely because w ranks her match very highly
(this is the detail that prevents the rank of w from concentrating).
For each man m, let a′m,w be an independent random variable which is 1 with probability
β(m)/(β(m) + Γw) and zero otherwise. Set r
′
w =
∑
m a
′
m,w, where the sum runs over all men. We
use r′w to study the expectation of rw. Let Pw denote the number of proposals w received during
DA. Note that w will never rank any man who proposed to her during DA above her eventual
match. However, we have E [rw] = E [
∑
m am,w] = E
[∑
m a
′
m,w
]
, where the sum runs over all men
who have not proposed to w, by the linearity of expectation. Thus, 1+E [r′w] ≥ E [rw] ≥ E [r′w]−Pw.
Our first task is to get a lower bound on the expectation of the average of r′w across tier i
women. By G.2 and a union bound, we know that with probability 1 − O(1/(2 lnn)), for each
tier j of men, tier i of women received (1 ± )Cj→in lnn proposals from men in tier j, where
Cj→i = (iαi/αmin)(δjβ−1j /δ · β−1). Let this event be denoted E. In this case,
(in)
−1 ∑
w∈Ti
Γw = (in)
−1(1± )
∑
j
iαi
αmin
· δj
δ · β−1n lnn = (1± )
αi
αmin
· lnn
δ · β−1
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Let R
′
i = (in)
−1∑
w∈Ti r
′
w. By Jensen’s inequality (applied to E [r
′
w] =
∑
m β(m)/(β(m)+Γw),
which is a convex function of Γw), we know that when E holds and for n large enough,
E
[
R
′
i
∣∣∣Γ] = (in)−1 ∑
w∈Ti
E
[
r′w
]
≥
∑
m
β(m)
β(m) + (in)−1
∑
w∈Ti E [Γw]
≥
∑
m
β(m)
(1 + 2)CΓ lnn
CΓ =
αi
αmin(δ · β−1)
≥ nδ · β
(1 + 2)CΓ lnn
≥ (1− 3)C(i) n
lnn
C(i) = (δ · β)(δ · β−1)αmin
αi
To complete the picture, we also need an upper bound on the expectation of r′w for a single
woman. Consider a woman w in tier i, and let Cj→w = (αi/αmin)(δjβ−1j /δ·β−1). By proposition G.2
and a union bound, the probability w receives less than (1 − )Cj→w lnn proposals from men in
tier j, for each j simultaneously, is O(1/(2
√
lnn)). By Markov’s inequality, we know that with
probability 1 − O(2 ln1/4 n), at least in/ log1/4 n women in tier i have at least (1 − )Cj→w lnn
proposals from men in tier j, for each j simultaneously. These women have
Γw ≥ (1− )
∑
j
βjCj→w lnn = (1− )CΓ lnn
E
[
r′w|Γ
] ≤∑
m
β(m)
Γw
≤ (1 + 2) nδ · β
CΓ lnn
= (1 + 2)C(i)
n
lnn
.
Note the following consequence of 4.3: a woman w receives Ω(lnn) proposals with probability
1 − n−Ω(1). Thus, by Markov’s inequality, with probability 1 − n−Ω(1), at most n1−Ω(1) women
receive fewer than O(lnn) proposals. With the remaining women, it’s possible that many women
get rank up to n. All told, we have that with probability 1−O(1/(2 ln1/4 n)),
E
[
R
′
i|Γ
]
≤ (1−O(1/ ln1/4 n))(1 + 2)C(i) n
lnn
+O(1/ ln1/4 n) ·O(n/ lnn) + n−Ω(1) · n
≤ (1 + 3)C(i) n
lnn
=⇒ E
[
R
′
i|Γ
]
= (1± 3)C(i) n
lnn
Now, conditioned on the realized weights {Γw}, the in variables r′w is independent, so Hoeffd-
ing’s inequality I.3 immediately gives us
P
[∣∣R′i − E [R′i] ≥ n3/4 ∣∣∣ Γ] ≤ 2 exp(−2(in)2(n3/4)2/(in3)) = 2 exp(−Θ(√n))
By G.4, with probability 1 − 1/n, no woman receives more than O(lnn) proposals, so Pw ≤
O(lnn) for all w. So in this case the difference between R
W
i and R
′
i is at most O(lnn), and we finally
have that with probability 1−O(1/(2 ln1/4 n))− 1/n− 2 exp(−Θ(√n)) = 1−O(1/(2 ln1/4 n)),
R
W
i = (1± 4)C(i)
n
lnn
.
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H Proofs for distribution of match types
Given the results of the previous appendix, our main theorem on the distribution of match types
is a fairly easy corollary.
Theorem 5.2. Consider an arbitrary tier i of women and j of men. For all  > 0, there is an n
large enough such that the probability that a woman in tier i matches to a man in tier j is (1± )δj.
Proof. Let Γj→w := βjSj→w denote the sum of public scores of all men in tier j who propose to
w. By proposition G.2 and a union bound over the constant number of tiers, we have that, with
probability 1− o(1),
Γj→w = (1± )δjUi Ui := αi
αmin
· lnn
δ · β−1
for each tier j simultaneously. Recall that the probability of a given proposal being the favorite out
of all those seen by w is independent of the order in which men propose to w. Thus, when the above
holds, the probability that w is matched to a man in tier j is (1± )δjUi/((1± )Ui) = (1± 3)δj .
In all other cases, the probability is between 0 and 1. Thus, for n large enough, the probability is
(1− o(1))(1± 3)δj + o(1) = (1± 4)δj overall.
Remark H.1. Unlike our results on the average rank of different tiers, the above result is only
proven “in expectation” instead of proving concentration. That is, we prove a result on the overall
probability of certain types matching, instead of results on what happens for the realized distribution
of match types (i.e. the fraction of matches which are made between tier i and tier j for each i, j)
with high probability.
We believe this is an artifact of our current proof technique, and conjecture that for any  > 0,
with probability approaching 1 we have that there are (1 ± )iδjn pairs formed from a woman in
tier i and a man in tier j. To prove this it would suffice to show that, similar to the situation for
the men, the match for different women is only very weekly correlated.
I Lemmas in probability theory
The proof of the next claim is given in [Ros06], Example 5.17. For completeness, we reproduce it
here.
Lemma A.3. Let TD be a coupon collector random variable with probabilities D = (pi)i∈[n]. For
i = 1, . . . , n, let Xi be an independent draw from Exp(pi), and let X = maxi∈[n]Xi. Then we have
E [TD] = E [X].
Proof. Consider n Poisson clocks, each ticking with rate pi for i = 1, . . . , n. Note that this is
equivalent to having a “master” Poisson clock, ticking with rate 1, and assigning every tick to one
of the n coupons according to the distribution (pi)i∈[n]. By definition, the amount of time between
ticks of a Poisson clock with rate pi is distributed exactly according to Exp(pi). Thus, the random
variable X is distributed exactly as the of time until all of the n clocks have ticked at least once.
We can see that the discrete time coupon collector T = TD can be recovered as one particular
random variable in this continuous-time process. Specifically, T is the number of times the “master
clock” ticked before all of the n clocks ticked at least once.
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We have X =
∑T
i=1 Si, where Si is the “ith inter-arrival time” of the master clock. Note that
Si is independent of T . Because the master clock ticks at rate 1, each Si is distributed according
to Exp(1) and has expectation 1, so we have
E [X] = E [E [X|T ]] = E
[
E
[
T∑
i=1
Si
∣∣∣∣T
]]
= E
[
T∑
i=1
E [Si|T ]
]
= E [T ]
We believe the following result is folklore:
Proposition I.1 (Maximum of exponential distributions). The maximum of k independent draws
from Exp(λ) is distributed identically to
k∑
i=1
Yi, Yi ∼ Exp(iλ)
(i.e. Yi are independent draws from Exp(iλ) for i = 1, . . . , n). In particular, the maximum has
expected value Hk/λ (for Hk the kth harmonic number) and variance Θ(1/λ).
Proof. We actually prove a more general claim about X(j), the jth order statistic of k independent
draws from Exp(λ). If Yi ∼ Exp(iλ) independently for i = 1, . . . , n, I claim that X(j) is (jointly)
distributed identically to
n∑
i=n−j+1
Yi.
To prove this claim, induct on j. For j = 1, this is just proving that the minimum of n draws
from Exp(λ) is distributed like Exp(nλ), which is a classic exercise in probability theory.
For j > 1, condition on X(j−1) = x. Now, X(j) is distributed like the minimum of n − j + 1
independent draws from U ∼ Exp(λ), conditioned on each of those draws being ≥ x. By the
“memoryless” property of the exponential distribution, the distribution of U − x conditioned on
U ≥ x is identical to the distribution of U . Thus, X(j) − X(j−1) is distributed exactly as the
minimum of n− j + 1 draws from Exp(λ), or equivalently one draw from Exp((n− j + 1)λ). The
claim then follows by induction.
Finally, the calculation of expectation and variance follows from the expectation and variance
of Exp(iλ) (and the bound on variance follows because
∑
i≥1 1/i2 = Θ(1)).
We also need the following standard concentration inequalities:
Proposition I.2 (Multiplicative Chernoff Bound). Let X1, . . . , Xn be independent random vari-
ables taking values in {0, 1}. Let X = ∑iXi and let µ = E [X]. Then for any 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, we
have
P [X ≤ (1− δ)µ] ≤ exp (−δ2µ/2)
P [X ≥ (1 + δ)µ] ≤ exp (−δ2µ/3)
and for any δ ≥ 1, we have
P [X ≥ (1 + δ)µ] ≤ exp (−δµ/3)
Proposition I.3 (Hoeffding’s Inequality). Let X1, . . . , Xn be independent random variables taking
values in [ai, bi]. Let X = (1/n)
∑
iXi and let µ = E [X]. Then for any t ≥ 0, we have
P [|X − µ| ≥ t] ≤ 2 exp
(
− 2n
2t2∑n
i=1(bi − ai)2
)
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J More Computational Experiments
In this section, we present three additional computational experiments in supplement to our theo-
retical estimates and the experiments in 6. The first experiment compares simulation results with
our predicted limits in theorem 4.8 and theorem 5.2. The second one attempts to further gener-
alize our results by showing that in slightly unbalanced markets the core is small and hence our
predictions should in fact apply to any stable matching in such markets. And the last experiment
takes a macro view on the distribution of matched pairs across tiers on both sides (i.e. the fraction
of tier i women matched to tier j men for each pair of i, j).
J.1 Numerical results and accuracy of the estimates
In the first experiment, we examine the accuracy of our asymptotic estimates in theorem 4.8 and
theorem 5.2 numerically. We consider a sequence of balanced markets characterized by the same
configuration of tiers on both sides but with growing total numbers of agents. Specifically, each
market consists of two tiers of men on the proposing side and three tiers of women receiving
proposals. The ratio of tier sizes is fixed at δ = (1/4, 3/4) for men and  = (1/16, 5/16, 5/8) for
women; the public scores for each tier have fixed ratio of β = (3, 1) for men and α = (3, 2, 1) for
women. The size of the market n, i.e. the number agents on each side, ranges from 24 to 219 at
each integer power of 2. For each market described above, we simulate 1,000 realizations of the
man-proposing DA, and with each realization, we compute the average rank of partners across
agents in each tier on each side. Figure 7 reports the average across realizations of the per tier
average rank of partners as the market size grows. Figure 8 shows the convergence of the ratios of
ranks of partners among tiers on each side.
J.2 Size of core for unbalanced markets
In this experiment, we turn our attention to the more generalized setting of unbalanced markets.
We provide some evidence that our prediction remains valid for slightly unbalanced markets, which
are common in real life, and also that the core of such markets is small. This is a similar to
the results in [AKL17], and would potentially imply that in an unbalanced setting our estimates
apply to not just the man-optimal stable matching, but indeed to any stable matching, because
the different between any stable matching and the man-optimal outcome is small.
We consider a one-side-tiered market, with 1,000 men in two tiers with fractional sizes δ =
(0.3, 0.7) and public scores β = (3, 1) and a number of women in one tier ranging from 990 to
1,010. In each set-up, we compute the average rank of agents in each tier under the man-optimal
outcome. Figure 9a shows the average ranks per tier across 1,000 realizations. We also computed
the fraction of men in each tier with unique stable partners (i.e. those whose partner under man-
optimal and woman-optimal are the same). The average percentage is shown in figure 9b.
J.3 Distribution of matched pairs among tiers
As we have seen from proposition 4.6, each individual man from tier i has a more advantageous
expected rank of partner than another man from tier j whenever βi > βj . In our last experiment,
we want to take a macro viewpoint and explore the distribution of matched pairs across tiers on
both side in the man-optimal stable matching in a tiered market.
We demonstrate this effect by considering a sequence of balanced markets with two tiers with
equal size on each side (i.e. δ =  = (0.5, 0.5), with public scores β = (3, 1) and α = (5, 1) for men
and women, respectively. The market size n grows from 24 to 218 at each integer power of 2. In
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(a) Average rank for men (b) Average rank for women
Figure 7: The solid line gives the average ranks for men and women of each tier in a sequence
of matching markets with fixed parameters δ = (1/4, 3/4),  = (1/16, 5/16, 5/8), β = (3, 1), and
α = (3, 2, 1). As remarks 3.3 and A.5 discuss, our estimates converge quite slowly in this market,
because min = 1/16 is small. The dashed lines indicate the estimates using our upper bound on the
total number of proposals (based on proposition A.2), and the dotted lines indicate the estimates
using the lower bound (based on proposition A.4, including the constants in the error term of order
O(n)).
(a) Ratio between average ranks of wives for men (b) Ratio between average ranks of husbands for
women
Figure 8: Ratios between average rank of partners across different tiers on each side. Theorem 4.8
and theorem 5.2 imply that, for men and women respectively, the average rank within each tier
is approximately proportional to the inverse of the public score of that tier in a sufficiently large
market, and hence the the average rank ratio between two tiers should be close to the inverse of
their public score ratio. In the simulation, the average rank ratio between the worse tier (tier 2
with α2 = 1) of men and the better (tier 1 with α1 = 3) converges to 3:1, and the rank ratios
between the tier 2 with α2 = 2, tier 3 α3 = 1 and tier 1 α1 = 3 of women converge to 3:2 and 3:1,
respectively. Notice again the very slow rate of convergence with the x-axis plotted in log scale, as
is natural due to the fact that the averages converge at rate O(1/ lnn).
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(a) Average rank of partners for agents of each tier.
Under the man-optimal outcome, the advantage flips
to women when the men’s side is longer by even
slightest amount.
(b) Fraction of men with unique stable partners.
The steep dip at zero reflects a low number of
agents with unique partners across all possible sta-
ble matchings when the market is balanced, hence
indicating a large core. When the market becomes
slightly unbalanced, however, we see that vast ma-
jority of agents have unique stable partners.
Figure 9: Matching markets with a fixed number of 1,000 men and a varying number of 990 to
1,010 women. The men side has parameters δ = (0.3, 0.7), β = (3, 1) and the women side is
homogeneous.
such markets, the distribution of matched pair can be solely characterized by the fraction of men
in tier 1 who are matched to women in tier 1, denoted by m11. For each market configuration in
the sequence, we simulate 1,000 realizations of man-proposing deferred acceptance, and recorded
the values of m11 for each realization. The result is shown in figure 10.
The simulation suggests that the distribution of matched pairs gets closer to uniformity as the
market size increases, with a slight skew benefiting the better tier. For example, for a market
with 1,000 men and women on each side with two tiers of equal size and β and α specified above,
52.4 ± 1.1% of the men in tier 1 are matched to women in tier 1. That is, top-tier men are only
slightly more likely than bottom tier men to match to top tier women, even though at a micro level
each man in the first tier on average does three times better than those in the second tier. In the
future, it may also be of interest to examine how the tier structure determines the deviation from
uniformity.
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Figure 10: Percentage of tier 1 men matched to tier 1 women under the man-optimal outcome in
markets with parameters δ =  = (0.5, 0.5), β = (3, 1), and α = (5, 1). The two dashed lines
indicate 3 and 97 percentile, respectively.
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